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Abstract 
Using a large sample of business groups from more than one hundred countries around the world, we 
show that group information matters for parent and subsidiary default prediction. Group firms may 
support each other when in financial distress. Potential group support represents an off-balance sheet 
asset for the receiving firm and an off-balance sheet liability for the firm offering support. We find 
that subsidiary information improves parent default prediction over and above group-level 
consolidated information possibly because intra-group exposures are netted out upon consolidation. 
Moreover, we document that the improvements in parent default prediction are decreasing in the 
extent of parent-country financial reporting transparency which suggests that within-group 
information matters most when consolidated financial statements are expected to be of lower quality. 
We also show that parent and other group-firms’ default risk exhibits predictive power for subsidiary 
default. Lastly, we find that within-group information explains cross-sectional variation in CDS 
spreads. Taken together, our findings contribute to prior literature on default prediction and have 
direct relevance to investors, credit-rating agencies and accounting regulators. 
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Using a large sample of business groups from more than one hundred countries around the world, we 
show that group information matters for parent and subsidiary default prediction. Group firms may 
support each other when in financial distress. Potential group support represents an off-balance sheet 
asset for the receiving firm and an off-balance sheet liability for the firm offering support. We find 
that subsidiary information improves parent default prediction over and above group-level 
consolidated information possibly because intra-group exposures are netted out upon consolidation. 
Moreover, we document that the improvements in parent default prediction are decreasing in the 
extent of parent-country financial reporting transparency which suggests that within-group 
information matters most when consolidated financial statements are expected to be of lower quality. 
We also show that parent and other group-firms’ default risk exhibits predictive power for subsidiary 
default. Lastly, we find that within-group information explains cross-sectional variation in CDS 
spreads. Taken together, our findings contribute to prior literature on default prediction and have 
direct relevance to investors, credit-rating agencies and accounting regulators. 
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In this paper we investigate whether business group information matters for default prediction. 
Business groups are a widespread organizational form in many countries and account for a large 
fraction of the world’s economic activity (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). A business 
group consists of a parent company and legally independent subsidiaries that function as a single 
economic entity through a common source of control.  
Group-affiliated firms may take advantage of their internal capital markets to overcome 
difficulties in accessing external finance (e.g., Desai et al., 2004; Claessens et al., 2006). The idea of 
group firms supporting each other (i.e., propping) is effectively described in the seminal study of 
Friedman et al. (2003). This sharing of intra-group resources often extends beyond financial resources 
and is an important determinant of firm performance (Chang and Hong, 2000).1 Business groups may 
be thought of as a nexus of implicit coinsurance contracts whereby group-affiliated firms financially 
support each other in case of need (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005; Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008). Through 
these mutual coinsurance agreements, business groups effectively engage in risk sharing thus 
preventing the failure of solvent entities subject to temporary liquidity shortfalls (Khanna and Yafeh, 
2005; Gopalan et al., 2007; Beaver et al., 2016).  
Following the argument above, one would expect intra-group dynamics to play an important role 
in the assessment of group-affiliated firms’ credit risk. However, whether business group affiliation 
matters for default prediction, and if so to what extent, is a priori unclear. On the one hand, an 
important raison d’être of business groups is that ultimate owners can exercise control over a large 
number of companies while containing their risk exposure through limited liability. Under the general 
principle of limited liability, because parents cannot be held responsible for the obligations of their 
subsidiaries, they may decide not to support a distressed subsidiary when this is too costly for the 
group (e.g., the selective default option). Notwithstanding the existence of active internal capital 
markets, limited liability plays an important role for business groups (e.g., Posner, 1976), a role 
which, according to Cestone and Fumagalli (2005), has often been neglected in the corporate finance 
                                                
1 A detailed discussion of the propping literature is presented in Section 2 along with a discussion of the studies 
that examine the tunneling phenomenon (Bertrand et al., 2002; Siegel and Choudhury, 2012), whereby intra-
group resource transfers may lead to capital misallocation. 
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literature. Support for the role of limited liability can, nonetheless, be found in Johnson et al. (2000) 
and Bianco and Nicodano (2006) who respectively highlight how, precisely because of limited 
liability, parent companies often shift risky projects to subsidiaries and raise group debt at the 
subsidiary level. Parents engaging in this type of strategic behavior seek to intentionally exploit 
limited liability to insulate themselves from the obligations of their subsidiaries (Blumberg, 1985). 
These parents are therefore very unlikely to bail out their financially distressed subsidiaries. 
Following this argument, group affiliation should, in principle, not matter for default prediction.  
On the other hand though, bankruptcy courts may rule to lift a parent’s limited liability protection 
(i.e., veil piercing) and hold the parent responsible for its subsidiaries’ obligations (Thompson, 1991; 
Vandekerchove, 2005; Erens et al., 2008; Matheson, 2008; Mevorach, 2009). Moreover, the default of 
a subsidiary can impose non-trivial costs on the parent (e.g., operational disruption, limited access to 
external capital, reputational loss), and generate a cascade of defaults within a group (e.g., due to 
cross-default clauses) (Gopalan et al., 2007; Elliott et al., 2014). As a result of these costs and the 
possibility of veil piercing, parents may choose to support their distressed subsidiaries. Thus, 
according to this alternative reasoning, group affiliation should, instead, matter for default prediction.2  
From a financial reporting perspective, the resources that are expected to flow from a parent to its 
financially distressed subsidiaries would represent an off-balance sheet asset for those subsidiaries. 
Conversely, a subsidiary’s implicit obligation to provide resources to a distressed parent (or other 
distressed subsidiaries) could be regarded as an off-balance sheet liability. The potential support 
received (offered) may represent an off-balance sheet asset (liability) in the separate financial 
statements of a parent as well.  
Group parents also typically prepare a set of consolidated financial statements whose goal is to 
reflect the financial position of the group as a whole.3 While in general a parent’s consolidated 
                                                
2 Moreover, prior studies further suggest that, in part because of limited liability, resource transfers that decrease 
credit risk (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1990; Gopalan et al., 2007) and resource transfers that increase credit risk (e.g., 
Bertrand et al., 2002) may as well co-exist within the same business group, which renders the overall net effect 
of intra-group transactions on parent and subsidiary default risk ex ante unclear. 
3 Both under U.S. GAAP and IFRS, a reporting entity that guarantees the debt of another entity may have to 
consolidate that entity, even if it has no voting control. Recourse debt issued by affiliates will therefore likely be 
reflected in the parent’s consolidated financial statements. However, this is not necessarily the case for non-
recourse debt, where the parent and the other subsidiaries in the corporate structure have no legal performance 
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financial statements are considered to be more comprehensive than its separate financial statements, 
not much is known about the loss of information that occurs as a result of this aggregation process. If 
consolidation does not leave behind credit-relevant within-group information, subsidiary financials 
should not add to consolidated statements for parent default prediction. However, the process of 
aggregation underlying consolidation may entail a loss of information (Demski, 1973). Upon 
consolidation in fact, intra-group exposures, which may contain credit-relevant information, are 
typically netted out and, as a result, consolidated financial statements may not be fully informative 
about a group’s overall credit standing. Therefore, whether parent consolidated financial statements 
fully subsume within-group credit-relevant information is an open empirical question. Furthermore, in 
the presence of information costs, it is crucial to understand the usefulness of more disaggregated 
subsidiary-level information for users of financial statements other than equity investors (Pendlebury, 
1980), and specifically the degree to which the inclusion of more disaggregated information improves 
default prediction (i.e., the materiality of this information for credit-risk assessment).4 
Moreover, whether group-level financial information improves on default prediction is an open 
question also because financial markets could already incorporate into prices all credit-relevant 
information that group firms’ separate and consolidated financial statements leave behind. It is in fact 
possible that traditionally-used market-based default predictors (e.g., distance to default) could (in 
part or in full) subsume this information. 
Consistent with the idea that group affiliation may matter for default prediction, credit rating 
agencies pay attention to the role played by internal capital markets as the group approaches financial 
distress. While Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rate most group firms on a standalone basis 
(Moody’s, 1999; S&P, 2014), they factor parent influence over subsidiaries’ credit worthiness into 
their assessments: “Potential for support or negative intervention from the parent company or group 
is a major rating consideration.” (S&P, 2014). For example, over the recent years S&P has made 
adjustments to the credit ratings of Caterpillar Inc., Chrysler Group LLC, The Coca-Cola Co., and 
                                                                                                                                                     
obligation in case of default. In that case, the amount the parent would likely spend to support or bail out the 
subsidiary is an off-balance sheet liability for the parent (and an off-balance sheet asset for that subsidiary). 
4 Broadening the set of default predictors (in this case by considering more disaggregated information) does not 




Hewlett-Packard Co.5  However, these adjustments are usually rather ad hoc and mainly rely on “soft” 
information that may be private to credit rating agencies. Hence, whether default prediction can be 
improved upon by using publicly available financial statements remains an open question. 
From the discussion above, whether group information matters for default prediction likely 
depends on the interplay and relative importance of: (i) limited liability protection, (ii) possibility of 
veil piercing, (iii) informativeness of market data, and (iv) quality of the consolidation process. 
Individually considered, these factors may lead to opposing empirical predictions. Thus, this inherent 
tension renders our investigation an important endeavor.  
There has been considerable empirical research on the ability of financial ratios, in isolation or in 
combination with market data, to predict financial distress (Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 
1980; Shumway, 2001; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Beaver et al., 2005). The unit of analysis of this line of 
the literature (for a review see Beaver et al., 2010 and Ak et al., 2013) has typically been the firm with 
its consolidated financial statements, regardless of whether operating as a standalone entity or as part 
of a business group.6  
The role of group affiliation in default prediction has likely been neglected by prior studies for 
two main reasons. First, high-quality group structure and ownership information, as well as granular 
financial statement data for (often private) group-affiliated firms, has only recently become available 
(e.g., Shroff et al., 2014; Beaver et al., 2016; Beuselinck et al., 2018). Second, most default-prediction 
studies typically focus on the U.S. market where in general business groups are less common than in 
Continental Europe and East Asia (Faccio and Lang, 2002; OECD, 2012).7 Collectively, these factors 
highlight the relevance of our research question and the importance of relying on a cross-country 
sample to study the role of group affiliation in default prediction. 
                                                
5 S&P North American Corporate Rating Scores by Industry Sector as of February 6th, 2014. 
6 Typically, prior literature focuses on the “firm” as the unit of analysis without a clear distinction on whether 
the firm is a standalone entity or a group of separate legal entities operating as a single economic entity. 
Throughout the paper, we use the term “firm” to refer to a separate legal entity, which may be standalone or a 
parent/subsidiary belonging to a group. While the term subsidiary is typically used to refer to an affiliate 
company in which the parent entity holds the majority of voting rights, we use the term subsidiary loosely to 
refer to an affiliate firm in which the parent has an ownership stake. 
7 While business groups may be less prevalent in the U.S. than in other countries, the U.S. foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outflows in 2014 represented approximately $300 billion (UNCTAD World Investment 
Report, 2016). Therefore, knowledge of how to price (credit) securities of foreign issuers, which are often part 
of business groups, is of paramount importance to U.S. investors alike. 
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In order to understand whether, and to what extent, group information aids in predicting and 
explaining credit risk of group-affiliated firms, we seek to answer the following questions: (1) Can 
group information help predict parent bankruptcy? (2) Do parent consolidated financial statements 
subsume within-group credit-relevant information? (3) If not, does parent-country financial reporting 
transparency explain differences in the incremental predictive ability of group information? (4) Can 
group information help predict subsidiary bankruptcy? (5) Finally, does group information help 
explain cross-sectional variation in credit default swap (CDS) spreads? 
Collectively, our findings provide evidence that group information matters for default prediction 
at both the parent and subsidiary level. Our study relies on the Orbis database which provides 
financial and ownership information for a large number of group-affiliated firms from around the 
world. We exploit granular data provided by financial statements of individual entities within the 
group to assess whether parent-subsidiary links and the financial health of group firms improve 
default prediction over and above group-level consolidated information. 
Using two different estimation approaches (i.e., a discrete hazard estimation and a Classification 
and Regression Trees (CART) estimation), we show that subsidiary-level default risk improves parent 
out-of-sample default prediction over and above consolidated financial statement information. This 
result is consistent with a loss of credit-relevant information resulting from the information 
aggregation process underlying accounting consolidation. Moreover, we show that the improvement 
in parent default prediction holds even when we control for market information. Similarly, parent and 
other group-firms’ default risk exhibits predictive power for subsidiary default prediction. Ceteris 
paribus, subsidiaries and their parent are more likely to file for bankruptcy if other group firms are 
close to financial distress. Furthermore, and in line with our expectations, we document a larger 
predictive power increase in the case of subsidiary default prediction. This is because consolidated 
financial statements provide (at least in part) information regarding subsidiaries’ overall credit 
worthiness.8  
                                                
8 We conduct an extensive set of additional tests to ensure that accounting for sharing of group resources (Chang 
and Hong, 2000), such as reputation and other intangibles, as well as for common business exposure, does not 
affect the tenor of our main findings. 
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The inherent complexity of business group ownership and financial structures often makes it 
difficult for enforcement authorities, auditors and regulators to assess the soundness and 
comprehensiveness of the consolidation process. When parent-country financial infrastructures are 
underdeveloped (i.e., poor investor protection, lax reporting enforcement, etc.), managers may have 
more leeway to opportunistically obscure subsidiary credit-relevant information through the 
consolidation process.9 The extent to which parent consolidated financial statements reflect group 
credit-relevant information is therefore likely to vary with parent-country financial reporting 
transparency.10 Accordingly, we next take advantage of the cross-country nature of our data to 
investigate whether the improvement in parent default prediction generated by the inclusion of 
subsidiary-level information varies with the extent of parent-country financial reporting transparency. 
Our findings suggest that: (i) the predictive power of a parent default prediction model based on 
consolidated financial information is lower when parents are domiciled in low financial reporting 
transparency countries, and more importantly (ii) subsidiary-level information improves the predictive 
ability of the parent default model more when parents are domiciled in low financial reporting 
transparency countries.  
Default, arguably, represents an extreme realization of credit risk. To examine the extent to which 
group information explains variation in credit risk more broadly, we test whether group information 
also determines cross-sectional variation in the pricing of credit-risk-sensitive securities. We show 
that subsidiary-level (parent-level) accounting information incrementally explains cross-sectional 
variation in parent (subsidiary) CDS spreads, controlling for a set of market variables that include a 
distance to default measure based on Merton (1974). By showing that group information plays a role 
beyond predicting realizations in the right tail of the credit-risk distribution, this analysis specifically 
highlights the economic significance of our findings.  
Our study contributes to the extensive literature on bankruptcy prediction and default risk (e.g., 
Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1985; Begley et al., 1996; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Beaver et al., 2005; Mayew 
                                                
9 Joos and Lang (1994) document substantial cross-country variation in the measurement of financial ratios as 
well as in the market valuation of accounting data. 
10 Prior studies find that the quality of country-level financial reporting infrastructures (e.g., auditing, 
enforcement, etc.) improves liquidity and valuations (Lang et al., 2012; Lang and Maffett, 2011).  
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et al., 2015) in several ways.11 First, we show how granular within-group ownership and financial 
information improves bankruptcy prediction and explains cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads 
even when controlling for market information. 
Second, our evidence highlights an important potential limitation of consolidated financial 
statements. Demski (1973) shows that any process of information aggregation entails a loss of 
information which varies across different financial statement users. Our results show that the 
information aggregation process involves some loss of credit-relevant information, and therefore can 
inform accounting standard setters and financial statement users (e.g., credit suppliers in general and 
lending officers in particular) who seek to understand the relative merits of consolidated financial 
information for credit-risk assessment. 
Third, we examine whether bankruptcy models, which have been extensively tested using 
consolidated financial information for firms listed in the U.S., can be extended to a cross-country 
setting with both public and private firms.12 We find that these bankruptcy models extend to privately-
held firms from a large sample of countries with considerable predictive power. This is an issue which 
has been largely unexplored in the U.S. because of lack of data availability, yet plays an important 
institutional role in private (e.g., bank) lending. 
Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that attempts to quantify the economic 
magnitude of intra-group support by estimating its net effect on group firms’ off-balance sheet assets 
and liabilities. 
Lastly, by showing that the parent model predictive power improvement due to subsidiary-level 
information varies with parent-country financial reporting transparency, our study contributes to the 
international accounting literature that examines the economic consequences of financial reporting 
transparency (e.g., Leuz, 2010; Lang et al., 2012; Lang and Maffett, 2011; Maffett et al., 2017). In 
particular, our evidence is consistent with the idea that different sources of information may 
complement each other in that when the degree of parent-country financial reporting transparency is 
                                                
11 Note that default-risk measures are often used either as primary variables of interest or as control variables in 
different settings. For example, Dechow et al. (2010) highlight the importance of properly controlling for default 
risk in earnings quality studies. 
12 Xu and Zhang (2009) stress the importance of assessing whether models developed for U.S. companies also 
work outside the U.S. 
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low, creditors can benefit more from relying on granular within-group information. We view our 
results as nicely complementing the evidence in Maffett et al. (2017) who examine whether the 
quality of accounting information affects the extent to which it can compensate for impaired market 
information. We examine, instead, the extent to which disaggregated subsidiary-level information can 
add to consolidated financial statements when the consolidation process is expected to be of lower 
quality (i.e., because of weak country-level institutions). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the role of 
group affiliation; Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 presents our base default prediction model; 
Section 5 examines whether group information can help predict parent default; Section 6 investigates 
the role of parent-country financial reporting transparency; Section 7 examines whether group 
information can help predict subsidiary default; Section 8 discusses the economic magnitude of our 
main findings; Section 9 investigates whether group information explains cross-sectional variation in 
CDS spreads; Section 10 presents the results of the analysis using the CART default estimation 
approach; and Section 11 concludes. 
 
2. The Role of Group Affiliation 
Prior studies on business groups (cf. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) for a review of the literature) have 
examined the value of group affiliation focusing on its potential benefits and costs.  
On the potential benefits side, a stream of the literature posits and finds that business groups take 
advantage of their internal capital markets to overcome difficulties in accessing external finance 
especially in emerging markets (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1991; Desai et al., 2004; Chittoor et al., 2005; 
Claessens et al., 2006). Business groups may in fact offer financial support to their financially 
distressed subsidiaries (i.e., propping). Friedman et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence consistent 
with propping taking place in pyramidal groups surrounding the 1997-1998 Asian crisis.13 Follow-up 
studies provide further evidence of propping in various settings (e.g., Bae et al. (2008) and Byun et al. 
(2013) for South Korea and Gopalan et al. (2007) for India). Propping may occur via a large set of 
related-party transactions including sales (e.g., Jian and Wong, 2010), trade credit (Kim and Nilsen, 
                                                
13 Specifically, Friedman et al. (2003) show that, compared to standalone firms and other group-affiliated firms, 
firms within pyramidal structures exhibit on average higher debt ratios and an attenuated negative association 
between debt ratios and stock returns during the crisis period. 
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2014), equity issuances (Almeida et al., 2015), and intra-group loans and loan guarantees (e.g., 
Gopalan et al., 2007; Jia et al., 2013; Buchuk et al., 2014; Beaver et al., 2016). Consistent with the 
idea of within-group financial support, a number of studies in the management literature emphasize 
the role of intangible-resource sharing, such as technological innovation and reputation. A notable 
example is Chang and Hong (2000; 2002) who document that intangible-resource sharing is an 
important determinant of performance for South Korean group-affiliated firms. 
On the potential costs side, another strand of the literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 1999; Johnson et 
al., 2000 and Bertrand et al., 2002) draws attention to a possible misallocation of capital across group 
firms at the expense of minority shareholders (i.e., tunneling). However, evidence on the costs 
associated with group affiliation is still subject to debate. Siegel and Choudhury (2012), for example, 
argue that  the empirical findings in Bertrand et al. (2002) may be confounded by differences in 
business strategy and corporate governance between group-affiliated and standalone firms.  
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) point out that the costs and benefits of group affiliation should not 
be considered in isolation. They argue that group affiliated firms trade off the costs of tunneling with 
the benefits of future expected propping, that is, they are willing to provide resources to other group 
firms in return for implicit insurance against their own future bankruptcy. Support for this 
coinsurance mechanism is offered by the theoretical model of Luciano and Nicodano (2014) that 
identifies conditions under which coinsurance may be optimal (i.e., it may increase the joint value of 
parents and their subsidiaries). Khanna and Yafeh (2005) examine the coinsurance mechanism 
empirically and find that it is prevalent in Japanese, South Korean and Thai business groups. 
In summary, while prior studies suggest that interdependencies among group firms may influence 
credit risk for the group as a whole, the empirical evidence on the role of group affiliation for default 
prediction is scant. Prior literature does not examine the incremental out-of-sample predictive power 
of group information for subsidiary and parent default, nor does it examine how this incremental 
predictive power changes across countries or firms. Also, prior studies do not speak to the loss of 
information in the consolidation process and mostly provide evidence based on single-country 
samples (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2007) with the resulting inferences potentially hinging on poor 
institutional quality settings where internal capital markets are a frequent alternative to external 
10 
 
finance (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Therefore, whether intra-group firm dynamics have implications 
for bankruptcy prediction remains an open empirical question. 
 
3. Data  
The main data we use for our empirical analysis come from Orbis, a database published by 
Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). Orbis relies on global data providers, such as the 
World Vest Base, as well as many well-established local data providers. To date, Orbis provides 
ownership, governance, and financial data for over 200 million public and private firms around the 
world. The extensive coverage of Orbis vis-à-vis other commercial databases which typically cover 
only large listed firms, is particularly important in this setting because large listed firms represent a 
small fraction of the economic activity for several of our sample countries (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 
2015). Further, for our tests relying on market data, we source equity returns and market capitalization 
data from Datastream, distance to default information from the National University of Singapore Risk 
Management Institute, and CDS data from Markit.14 We provide additional details on the construction 
of our dataset in the Online Appendix. 
 
4. Default Prediction Model 
We use a two-pronged approach to test whether group information matters for default prediction 
at the parent and subsidiary levels. First, we estimate a discrete hazard model within the sample of 
non-bankrupt firms and bankrupt firms that includes data for all the years prior to the final year before 
bankruptcy (following Shumway (2001)). Second, because this estimation relies on assumptions 
regarding the functional form of the association between bankruptcy probability and the different 
predictors and does not capture non-linearities and interactions among these variables, we also rely on 
a non-parametric estimation approach. In particular, we use the CART methodology developed by 
Breiman et al. (1984). We discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of these two estimation 
techniques in the Online Appendix. 
While each methodology (hazard and CART estimation) has its advantages and disadvantages, 
we choose to use a hazard model approach in our main analysis because this is the approach most 
                                                
14 Several other studies rely on Markit as a source of CDS spread data (e.g., Kim et al., 2013). 
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commonly used in the default prediction literature (e.g., see Beaver et al., 2010). Moreover, this 
ensures that our findings are comparable to those of prior default prediction studies. Nonetheless, we 
also report for robustness the results from the CART analysis as the complementarity of the two 
approaches ensures that the results that we document do not hinge on the specificities of a particular 
model. 
Our hazard model analysis is based on the Beaver et al. (2005) accounting model. We use an 
accounting-based model since 60% of parents and 66% of subsidiaries in our sample are private.15  
We extend the model by including a loss indicator (Beaver et al., 2012) and the logarithm of the 
parent/subsidiary total assets.16 Furthermore, we estimate the model with a country/industry/time 
varying baseline, by including the country-industry-level bankruptcy rate of the previous year as an 
additional explanatory variable. We use a varying baseline to take into account the fact that 
bankruptcies are likely correlated with (country- and industry-specific) macroeconomic fluctuations 
and country-level institutional characteristics. This approach is in line with Chava and Jarrow (2004) 
and Hillegeist et al. (2004). We compare this model with alternative model specifications using a 
constant sample in the Online Appendix and show that this model has higher out-of-sample predictive 
power compared to the other models presented.17 These include country-specific estimations that 
account for heterogeneity in legal regimes and accounting systems around the world, as well as 
specifications that directly control for macroeconomic factors (e.g., GDP growth (ܨܩܦܲ݃௜,௧) and 
inflation (ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧)). 
Our analysis is thus based on the following model (hereafter, the base model): 
ܲݎ൫ ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܧܶܮ௜,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ሻ, (1)
                                                
15 One caveat of our analysis, which we share with many default prediction studies, is that, by construction, we 
are unable to consider every single variable that could potentially be relevant for bankruptcy prediction. 
Therefore, we choose to base our analysis on Beaver et al. (2005) who find that their parsimonious accounting 
model produces similar results in terms of predictive ability to other accounting models, such as the ones 
developed by Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984). 
16 The original Beaver et al. (2005) combined model includes a size proxy based on market capitalization.  
17 Our analysis also suggests that, although the predictive power of the default prediction model for private firms 
is not as high as for public firms, it is still highly significant, implying economically important likelihood ratios. 
Some of the documented public-private difference could be due to heterogeneity in the quality of accounting 
information (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
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where the subscripts ݅ and ݐ denote the firm and the year, respectively. ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise; ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the return on assets (ܴܱܣ௜,௧ሻ is negative, and zero otherwise; ܴܱܣ௜,௧ 
is the ratio of net income to lagged total assets; ܮܶܣ௜,௧ is book leverage, the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets; ܧܶܮ௜,௧ is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total liabilities; ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets and ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ is the country-
industry-level bankruptcy rate. Following the approach in Beaver et al. (2005), we fill in missing 
values of the explanatory variables with their lagged values (using up to two lags). We also winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 2nd and 98th percentile of their distributions to mitigate the influence of 
outliers and potential data errors.18 We estimate our base model separately for parents, subsidiaries, 
and standalone firms.19 All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
We expect loss-making firms (with ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ equal to one), firms with higher leverage (ܮܶܣ௜,௧ሻ, 
smaller size (ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ) and firms in countries and industries with higher bankruptcy 
rates	ሺܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧) to exhibit a higher probability of default. Conversely, more profitable firms 
(higher ܴܱܣ௜,௧	and ܧܶܮ௜,௧) should exhibit lower bankruptcy rates.  Based on this model, we estimate 
the probability that each firm in the sample files for bankruptcy within the following 12 months as 
follows:	ܲݎ൫ పܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯෣ ൌ ௘௫௣	ሺ௑೔,೟ఉ෡ሻଵା௘௫௣	ሺ௑೔,೟ఉ෡ሻ. We describe our sample selection procedure and present 
descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest in the Online Appendix. 
 
5. Can Group Information Help Predict Parent Default? 
5.1.  Augmenting the Parent Default Prediction Model 
Table 1, Panel A, Column (1) presents the coefficients from the estimation of the base default 
prediction model for the sample of parent firms. We limit the analysis to business groups where we 
have available ownership information to compute control rights, i.e., the Base Model Sample (see 
                                                
18 We choose to winsorize variables at the 2nd and 98th percentiles of their distributions because large outliers 
remain when we, consistent with other studies in the bankruptcy literature, winsorize the data at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. In untabulated robustness tests, we repeat our analysis by winsorizing variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their distributions. Our findings are unaffected by this alternative design choice.  
19 We estimate our bankruptcy models separately to account for potential confounding effects due to the 
inherent heterogeneity across these different types of firms. 
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Table OA-2 in the Online Appendix). We find that small, loss-making parents, with high leverage and 
low profitability, are more likely to file for bankruptcy.  
To test the extent to which group-level information contributes to parent default prediction, we 
begin by examining whether the parent default prediction model in Column (1) can be improved by 
incorporating subsidiary-level financial information. In particular, we augment the base model 
(equation (1)) by incorporating the average bankruptcy probability of the parent’s subsidiaries 
(ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത) estimated using “expanding windows” to avoid a potential look-ahead bias and the risk 
of ex post over-fitting the data.20, 21  
Note that the simple inclusion of an additional explanatory variable (in this case ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത) does 
not automatically increase the out-of-sample predictive power of our model. On the contrary, a more 
complex model could pick up on spurious patterns of the learning sample and, as a result, may exhibit 
lower out-of-sample predictive power.  
We estimate the following hazard model, where the subscripts ݌ and ݏ are used to identify 
parent- and subsidiary- level variables, respectively.  
ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ ቀܴܱܰܣ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧, ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത	ቁ.	 (2)
Because the significance of the coefficients may be affected by cross-sectional and time-series 
correlation, we cluster, unless otherwise stated, standard errors by parent country and year.22 This 
clustering strategy takes into account the correlation of bankruptcy probabilities over time for a given 
parent country and across parent countries within a given year.23 Column (2) reports the results from 
this analysis. Compared to Column (1), the number of observations decreases as we include 
                                                
20 Table OA-1, Panel B, Column (5) in the Online Appendix reports the coefficients from the model that we use 
to estimate subsidiary default probability (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ)). 
21 The expanding window approach consists of estimating a different set of coefficients for each year using all 
available information up to that year. For example, the probability that a firm goes bankrupt in 2007 (calculated 
at the end of 2006) is the product of the financial ratios at the end of 2006 and a set of coefficients estimated by 
running a regression that includes all bankruptcy years up to 2006). The probability that the firm goes bankrupt 
in 2008 (calculated at the end of 2007) is based on a set of coefficients estimated by running a regression that 
includes all sample years up to 2007, and so forth. 
22  Throughout the paper, whenever not feasible to estimate standard errors clustered by parent (subsidiary) 
country and year, we cluster by parent (subsidiary) and year instead. 
23 In untabulated robustness tests, we re-run all our models that include generated regressors (such as the 
estimated bankruptcy probability of another firm) with bootstrapped standard errors to mitigate a potential 
“errors in variables” problem (Carroll et al., 2006). 
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ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത	 due to data availability requirements on subsidiary bankruptcy information. Controlling 
for their own financial ratios, parents whose subsidiaries exhibit a high average bankruptcy 
probability are more likely to file for bankruptcy themselves. Specifically, a one standard deviation 
increase in average subsidiary bankruptcy probability is associated with a 20% relative increase in 
parent bankruptcy probability. 
The findings above document an increase in the predictive power of the parent default model 
once subsidiary-level financial information is taken into account. However, since the Base Model 
Sample includes all available subsidiaries (i.e., also unconsolidated subsidiaries) we cannot entirely 
attribute the increase in the predictive power to a potential loss of credit-relevant information 
generated by the accounting consolidation process. On the contrary, the predictive power 
improvement may well be due to the exclusion of credit-risk relevant subsidiaries from the 
consolidation perimeter.  
To better identify the extent to which the predictive power improvement is due to a loss of credit-
relevant information that occurs as a result of the aggregation process underlying accounting 
consolidation, we repeat our tests on a sub-sample of parents for which (i) consolidated financial 
statements are available, and (ii) only consolidated subsidiaries are retained, i.e., where these parents 
have control rights higher or equal to 50%.24 We accordingly compute ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത	only for the subset 
of consolidated subsidiaries and find that it is still significant (Column (5)). This result suggests that 
consolidated financial statements entail a potential loss of credit-relevant information. Because 
accounting consolidation may leave behind credit-relevant information, granular within-group 
information has incremental predictive power. Nonetheless, the lower economic magnitude of the 
coefficient on ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത in Column (5) compared to Column (2) is consistent with consolidated 
financial statements reflecting (at least in part) group-level information.  
                                                
24 This approach for identifying consolidated subsidiaries is subject to type 1 and type 2 errors. On the one hand, 
voting rights are measured with noise, namely if there are dual-class shares. On the other hand, both under U.S. 
GAAP (FASB Accounting Standards Codification 810) and IFRS (IFRS 10), a reporting entity with no voting 
control in another entity may have to consolidate that entity if it has the power to direct its most significant 
economic activities. In that case, the owner of a majority (or all) of the voting rights may be required to 
deconsolidate the subsidiary. 
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Because several group parents take the organizational form of financial holding companies (i.e., 
financial parents), a potential concern with our previous results is that the predictive power 
improvement that we document may be driven by the specific limitations of financial holding 
companies’ accounting information (i.e., “shell” companies whose balance sheet merely reflects 
interests in other corporate entities). To mitigate this potential concern, we repeat the analysis by 
restricting our sample to business groups whose parents are not financial holding companies. We find 
our results to be qualitatively similar (Columns (7) to (9)). This provides reassurance that our 
inferences are not driven by the inclusion of financial parents in our sample. 
Moreover, to mitigate the possibility that our findings may be driven by within-group 
bankruptcies, we expand equation (2) to include an indicator ( തܻ௦,௧) for whether any of the group’s 
subsidiaries files for bankruptcy in year ݐ (Columns (3), (6) and (9)). This variable is positive and 
incrementally significant as expected.25 
Panel B compares the predictive ability of the different models. We use the coefficients from 
Panel A to obtain forecasts of the probability of bankruptcy. We rank those forecasts within the 
sample of parents with available information on subsidiary bankruptcy probability. This ensures that a 
constant sample is used in the comparison of the different models. The predictive ability of the base 
model is comparable to that reported in Table OA-1, Panel C in the Online Appendix for all parents.26 
We document an increase in the percentage of bankruptcies in the top three deciles of predicted 
bankruptcy probability and in the AUC as the average subsidiary bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത) 
and the subsidiary bankruptcy indicator ( തܻ௦,௧) are added to the base model. The predictive power 
                                                
25 In untabulated analyses available upon request, we test alternative ways to combine subsidiary bankruptcy 
probabilities. In particular, we compute: (1) a weighted average, where each subsidiary bankruptcy probability is 
weighted by the magnitude of its assets relative to the group’s consolidated assets; (2) the maximum probability 
of bankruptcy across all subsidiaries within the business group; (3) an indicator variable equal to one if there is a 
high-risk subsidiary in the group (i.e., if there is a subsidiary whose predicted bankruptcy probability is in the 
top three deciles of the distribution); and (4) the percentage of  consolidated assets that belong to high-risk 
subsidiaries. We find that each of these alternative measures is incrementally associated with the parent 
bankruptcy probability, controlling for the parent’s financial ratios. Furthermore, we test whether the association 
we document is incremental to the previously documented diversification effect (e.g., Hann et al., 2013). We 
compute industry and geographic diversity indices based on the Shannon entropy index and find that, while both 
indices are negative and significant, consistent with the diversification effect, the average probability of 
bankruptcy of the group’s subsidiaries remains significant when we control for these two indices. 
26 In the Online Appendix, we present the estimation of default prediction models for the full sample of parents 
and subsidiaries irrespective of whether ownership information required to compute control rights is available. 
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increases not only in the Base Model Sample but also in (i) the sub-sample of business groups with 
consolidated subsidiaries whose parents have consolidated financial statements available, and (ii) the 
sub-sample of business groups whose parents are non-financial holding companies.27 
The AUC reflects the trade-off between the sensitivity and specificity of a model. Sensitivity 
measures the extent to which the model correctly identifies bankrupt firms. It reflects the percentage 
of bankrupt firms that the model accurately classifies as bankrupt (i.e., the “true positive rate,” TPR). 
In contrast, specificity measures the extent to which the model correctly identifies non-bankrupt firms. 
It reflects the percentage of healthy (i.e., non-bankrupt) firms that the model correctly classifies as 
healthy (i.e., the “true negative rate,” TNR). Sensitivity and specificity are both desirable features of a 
default prediction model, and considering the two is essential to evaluate a model’s predictive power. 
While in a high sensitivity model, a low estimated bankruptcy probability provides substantial 
reassurance that a firm will not file for bankruptcy, a high estimated bankruptcy probability has low 
information content. In contrast, while bankruptcy will likely occur if a low specificity model predicts 
a high bankruptcy probability, a low estimated bankruptcy probability is not useful for ruling out 
bankruptcy in this case. We examine how the inclusion of the average subsidiary bankruptcy 
probability (ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത) improves the sensitivity and specificity of the base model in Figure OA-2 in 
the Online Appendix. The augmented model exhibits higher sensitivity and specificity than the base 
model. This indicates that the inclusion of group information helps to correctly classify both bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt firms.  
 
5.2. Placebo Test 
To mitigate the concern that our results may be driven by country- and/or industry-level default 
correlations not attributable to business group dynamics, we construct a counterfactual for our main 
analysis by conducting a placebo test on a sample of pseudo-groups. We match each individual 
subsidiary to the respective median-sized standalone firm in the same country-industry. In each 
                                                
27 The model’s predictive power is higher for non-financial than for financial firms. This is as expected because 
financial firms’ accounting ratios have different properties and a highly-regulated industry, such as the financial 
sector, has special forces at play (e.g., “too big to fail” phenomenon) that could influence the ability of financial 
statement information to assess probability of failure.  In fact, most bankruptcy studies exclude financial firms. 
However, because financial institutions within a group can play an important role in financial distress (Hoshi et 
al., 1990; Claessens et al., 2003), we choose to keep them in the sample. Moreover, although lower, the 
predictive ability of the models for financial firms is still significant. 
17 
 
business group we then replace each real subsidiary with the respective matched standalone (i.e., the 
pseudo-subsidiary) firm to form a pseudo-group. If results of our main tests are driven by 
unobservable common factors, the placebo test results should closely mirror the results of our main 
analysis. Placebo test results are reported in Table OA-3 in the Online Appendix. We find that the 
average estimated pseudo-subsidiary bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത) is not significant in any 
of the specifications, and neither is their observed default rate ( തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧).   
Most importantly, neither the AUC nor the percentage of bankruptcies in the top three deciles of 
predicted probability increase as standalone information is added to the model. Collectively, results 
from these placebo tests increase our confidence that the incremental explanatory power of 
subsidiary-level information for parent bankruptcy is not an artifact of country and industry 
correlations. 
 
5.3.  Incremental Predictive Power of Group Information with Respect to Market Data 
Prior research has documented that default prediction models that combine accounting and 
market information exhibit a higher predictive power compared to pure accounting models (for a 
survey of this literature, please refer to Beaver et al. (2010) and Ak et al. (2013)). While only a small 
percentage of our sample firms are publicly listed entities, it may still be the case that, for listed firms, 
market variables subsume all group information. To investigate whether this is the case, we estimate a 
parent combined model where we add distance to default to the financial ratios in our base model. 
Distance to default (ܦ2ܦ௣,௧) is based on a modification of the Merton (1974) model, as outlined in 
Duan et al. (2012). The main determinants of distance to default are market leverage and asset 
volatility. Table OA-4, Panel A in the Online Appendix presents the results of this analysis.28 As 
expected, ܦ2ܦ௣,௧ exhibits a negative and significant association with the parent bankruptcy 
probability. Most importantly, the average subsidiary bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ൯തതതതതതതതതതതതത) remains 
positive and significant. This is also the case when distance to default is replaced by a linear 
combination of the variables in the Beaver et al. (2005) market model: equity volatility (ܸܱܮ௣,௧), size 
(ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧) and equity returns (ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧). Most importantly, the inclusion of group information 
                                                
28 All unlisted parent companies are excluded from this analysis. 
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increases the out-of-sample predictive ability of the combined models, as measured both by the AUC 
and the percentage of bankrupt firm-years in the top three deciles of predicted probability (Panel B). 
Our findings suggest that the market variables traditionally used in default prediction do not 
subsume subsidiary-level information and, therefore, a parent default prediction model that combines 




6. The Role of Financial Reporting Transparency 
Our evidence thus far suggests that the predictive ability of a default prediction model based on 
parent consolidated accounting information can be improved by including subsidiary-level 
information. We have also shown that the improvement in predictive power is likely due to a loss of 
credit-relevant information resulting from the information aggregation process underlying accounting 
consolidation. Hence, our results are suggestive that the process of accounting consolidation may 
leave behind valuable credit-relevant information.  
The conclusion above hinges on whether the consolidation process takes properly into account all 
subsidiary-level information relevant for credit-risk assessment. However, when parent-country 
financial reporting transparency is weak (e.g., because country-level financial infrastructures are 
underdeveloped) parent managers may have more leeway to obfuscate credit-relevant intra-group 
transactions in the process of accounting consolidation. We therefore expect that when parent-country 
financial reporting transparency is low, the improvement in the model’s predictive ability is higher. 
In order to test this conjecture, we examine whether the incremental predictive power of the 
parent default model induced by the inclusion of subsidiary-level information is higher when parent-
country reporting transparency is low. We classify a parent as having high (low) financial reporting 
transparency if a parent country falls in the Leuz (2010) institutional clusters 1 or 2 (3, 4, or 5) (Lang 
and Maffett, 2011; Maffett et al., 2017). These clusters are based on several securities regulation, 
investor protection and enforcement characteristics that support financial reporting transparency.  
Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. We focus on the sub-sample of the Base Model 
Sample which is limited to parents with consolidated financial statements available and subsidiaries 
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that are included in the consolidation perimeter. We estimate the base and augmented models 
separately for the sub-samples of parents with high and low financial reporting transparency (Table 2, 
Panel A). In line with our expectations, we find that the predictive power of the base and augmented 
models is higher when parent-country financial reporting transparency is high (Table 2, Panel B). This 
is consistent with country-level reporting transparency increasing the informativeness of accounting 
information for default prediction. Most interestingly, we find that the incremental predictive power 
of the augmented model (with respect to the base model) is higher for parents domiciled in countries 
with low levels of financial reporting transparency. In fact, while for parents domiciled in low 
reporting transparency countries both the percentage of defaults in the top three deciles of predicted 
bankruptcy probability and the AUC increase as subsidiary-level information is added to the base 
model, this is not the case for parents domiciled in countries with high levels of reporting 
transparency. The increase in the AUC for parents from low reporting transparency countries as group 
information is included appears to be mainly driven by an increase in specificity. A model that 
incorporates subsidiary-level information is less likely to misclassify solvent firms as bankrupt.  
It is also interesting to note that the higher increase in predictive power for business groups whose 
parents are located in low reporting transparency countries is unlikely driven by their subsidiaries’ 
reporting quality. This is because most business groups tend to invest in subsidiaries from the same 
(or similar) countries, which is consistent with the home bias phenomenon (Shroff et al., 2014; 
Beuselinck et al., 2018). 
To address a potential concern that the results we document in this analysis are driven by a likely 
negative association between financial reporting quality and importance of internal capital markets in 
parent countries, we perform additional tests in which we further partition our sample based on the 
strength of parent-country capital market development and rule of law. We report these results in 
Table OA-5 in the Online Appendix. We find a significant increase in predictive power for sample 
partitions where financial reporting transparency is low, irrespective of the strength of parent-country 
capital market development or rule of law. These findings, therefore, rule out the potential alternative 




7. Can Group Information Help Predict Subsidiary Default? 
7.1.  Augmenting the Subsidiary Default Prediction Model 
Having established that parent default prediction can be improved by incorporating subsidiary 
default-risk information, we next examine whether a subsidiary default prediction model can be 
improved by incorporating financial information regarding the parent as well as the other subsidiaries 
in the same business group. Naturally, we expect the magnitude of the predictive power increase to be 
greater for the subsidiary model than for the parent model, because parent consolidated financial 
statements capture, at least in part, subsidiary-level information. 
To conduct this analysis, for each subsidiary in the Base Model Sample, we retain the parent with 
highest control rights. We then augment the subsidiary default prediction model by incorporating the 
parent bankruptcy probability estimated as per equation (1) as follows:29     
ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧, ܲݎሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ	ሻ.	 (3)
We hypothesize that the coefficient on ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ		in equation (3) is positive and significant. We 
also estimate augmented versions of equation (3) by including an indicator variable for whether the 
parent files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ( ௣ܻ,௧), the average probability of bankruptcy of other group 
subsidiaries (ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത), as well as an indicator variable equal to one if any of the group’s 
subsidiaries files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ( ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത).  
Table 3, Panel A presents the results from the estimation of these augmented models. We cluster, 
unless otherwise stated, standard errors by subsidiary country and year. We find that the parent 
bankruptcy probability is positively and significantly associated with the subsidiary bankruptcy 
probability, controlling for the subsidiary’s own characteristics (Column (2)).30 When the parent 
bankruptcy probability increases by one standard deviation, the subsidiary bankruptcy probability 
experiences a relative increase of 26.8%. Controlling for their own financial health and for the parent 
bankruptcy probability, subsidiaries in groups where the average default risk of the other subsidiaries 
                                                
29 In untabulated analysis, we also examine an unconstrained specification in which we include the parent’s 
financial ratios linearly in the regression. We find that the financial ratios of the parent are significant and 
exhibit the predicted sign, with the exception of ܧܶܮ௣,௧.  
30 The number of observations in Columns (2) to (6) is lower than in Column (1) due to the availability of 
subsidiary bankruptcy information. 
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is higher, are also more likely to file for bankruptcy in the following year (Column (3)). Observed 
bankruptcy rates in the group in year ݐ are also significantly associated with future subsidiary 
bankruptcy (Columns (4) to (6)). 
Panel B examines the predictive power of the models using a constant sample. Compared to the 
base model in Column (1) the augmented model in Column (2), which includes an estimate of the 
parent bankruptcy probability, exhibits a higher percentage of bankrupt firms and years before 
bankruptcy in the top three deciles of predicted bankruptcy probability (53.55 vs. 52.68 and 46.69 vs. 
45.68). The AUC is also significantly higher, increasing from 68.04 to 72.45. The predictive power of 
the model increases when we include the average default probability of the other subsidiaries 
(ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത) (model (3)), and when we include information on actual bankruptcies within the 
same group in year ݐ ( ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത), in addition to the predicted bankruptcy probabilities (models (4) and 
(5)). A model that also includes an indicator for whether the parent files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ( ௣ܻ,௧) 
(model (6)) performs better than the base model, but underperforms the models that include estimated 
probabilities of parent and subsidiary bankruptcy.   
The increase in AUC is mostly driven by an increase in sensitivity (Figure OA-2 in the Online 
Appendix). The specificity of the augmented model is similar to that of the base model indicating that, 
compared to the base model, the augmented model is better able to identify bankrupt firms and does 
so without at the same time misclassifying healthy firms as bankrupt.  
The previous analysis shows that, consistent with our initial hypothesis and the evidence of the 
parent default prediction analysis presented in Section 5, group affiliation plays a role in bankruptcy 
and should be taken into account for parent, as well as subsidiary, default prediction. Furthermore, 
and as expected, group information plays a more significant role in subsidiary (as opposed to parent) 
default prediction, consistent with parent consolidated financial statements capturing, albeit not to a 
full extent, subsidiary-level credit risk. 
 
7.2.  Placebo Test 
Similar to the case of parent default prediction, a potential concern with our analysis is that the 
association between parent and subsidiary bankruptcy reported in Table 3, Panels A and B, might be 
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due to industry and country unobservable common factors. In order to mitigate this concern, we repeat 
our tests using pseudo-groups where, for each business group, we replace the parent with the median-
sized country-industry standalone firm (i.e., the pseudo-parent). We report the results of this analysis 
in Table OA-6 in the Online Appendix. We find that the estimated pseudo-parent bankruptcy 
probability (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ) is not significant in any of the specifications. Moreover, the AUC and the 
percentage of bankruptcies in the top three deciles of predicted probability decrease as the pseudo-
parent information is added to the model.  Results of this placebo test increase our confidence that the 
incremental explanatory power of parent-level information for subsidiary bankruptcy is not an artifact 
of country and industry correlations.  
 
7.3. Resource Sharing and Common Business Exposure 
Our placebo tests indicate that the incremental predictive power of group information is unlikely 
to be driven by country and industry unobservable common factors. However, our placebo tests do not 
directly address the fact that group-affiliated firms may share different types of resources and 
capabilities (e.g., Chang and Hong, 2000), as well as business exposure, as a result of intra-group 
transactions. We therefore conduct an additional set of tests to ensure that accounting for the sharing 
of group resources, such as reputation and other intangibles, as well as for common business 
exposure, does not affect the tenor of our main findings. We build upon the discussion and analysis in 
Chang and Hong (2000) to identify factors associated with the likelihood of resource sharing and 
common business exposure. We then use these factors to identify sub-samples of parent-subsidiary 
pairs for which resource sharing and common business exposure are less likely to play an important 
role. Finding that predictive power increases also in the sub-samples where shared resources and 
common business exposure are less likely would provide reassurance that these factors are not the 
sole driver of our findings. 
To gauge the extent of resource sharing, we partition our sample relying on four different proxies 
based on: (1) whether a subsidiary is named after its parent. This proxy reflects the likelihood that 
external stakeholders perceive the group as a unique entity (Beuselinck et al., 2018), and hence that 
reputation and brand loyalty are shared among group firms (Chang and Hong, 2000); (2) whether a 
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parent has specialized knowledge. Knowledge is a fundamental intangible resource that is often 
shared across firms within the same business group. To capture knowledge sharing, we follow a 
similar approach to Christie et al. (2003) to identify parent firms with high and low degrees of 
knowledge specialization; (3) whether a subsidiary is domestic. Resource sharing is more likely to 
occur when a subsidiary and its parent are in close geographic proximity (Giroud, 2013; Bahar, 2016); 
(4) whether a subsidiary operates in the same industry of its parent. Resource sharing is likely more 
pronounced when a subsidiary and its parent operate in the same industry (Alfaro and Charlton, 
2009). 
Results documented in Table 4, Panel A show that parent default risk information has incremental 
predictive power also in sub-samples of parent-subsidiary pairs where resource sharing is less likely 
to occur (i.e., the subsidiary is not named after its parent; the parent has no specialized knowledge; the 
subsidiary is not domestic; and the subsidiary is in a different industry than the parent). This provides 
reassurance that our findings are above and beyond the effect of resource sharing. 
With the caveat that sharing of resources and common business exposure are inherently 
intertwined and therefore our proxies likely capture both constructs, we rely on three additional 
proxies to capture common business exposure more directly: (1) whether a parent is a major supplier 
of its subsidiary; (2) whether a parent is a major customer of its subsidiary; and (3) whether a parent is 
either a major supplier or a major customer of its subsidiary. Following Bena and Ortiz-Molina 
(2013), we utilize the industry input-output matrix to determine the likelihood that a parent is a major 
customer or supplier of its subsidiary, based on the observed input-output flows of their respective 
industries.31  
Table 4, Panel B presents the results of these tests. We find that parent default probability remains 
significant and has incremental predictive power also within sub-samples of parent-subsidiary pairs 
with low common business exposure (i.e., where the parent is not a major supplier and/or customer of 
                                                
31 We classify a parent as a major supplier of its subsidiary if the purchases made by its subsidiary’s industry 
from the parent’s industry represent more than 2% of the purchases made by the subsidiary industry. We 
classify a parent as a major customer of its subsidiary if the purchases made by the parent’s industry from its 
subsidiary’s industry represent more than 2% of the total output of the subsidiary industry. A subsidiary is then 
classified as having high business exposure to its parent if the parent is classified as being either a major 
supplier or a major customer of its subsidiary. 
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its subsidiary). This additional evidence provides reassurance that common business exposure is 
unlikely to be the main reason behind our findings. 
 
7.4.  Incremental Predictive Power of Group Information with Respect to Market Data 
While only a small percentage of our sample subsidiaries are publicly listed entities, for listed 
subsidiaries market variables might subsume group financial information. To assess whether this is 
the case, and following the parent analysis presented in Section 5.3, we estimate two subsidiary 
combined models. We present the results of this analysis in Table OA-7 in the Online Appendix. The 
first model includes distance to default, ܦ2ܦ௣,௧, whereas the second model includes ܸܱܮ௣,௧, 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧, and ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧. ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ൯ and ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത remain significant as we add market 
information (Panel A). Most importantly, the inclusion of these variables still significantly increases 
the predictive ability of the combined models notwithstanding the inclusion of market information 
(Panel B). Taken together, these findings suggest that market information does not subsume group-
level information.32 
 
8. Gauging the Economic Magnitude of Our Findings 
Gauging the economic magnitude of a default prediction model with a simple comparison 
between AUCs may be misleading given the asymmetric nature of the loss function. This is because 
the loss from misclassifying a distressed firm is greater than the loss of misclassifying a healthy firm. 
As a result, what might appear a small improvement in predictive ability could in fact represent a 
substantial increase in the profitability of creditors (Stein and Jordao, 2003). Bankruptcy prediction 
plays an important role in private (i.e., bank) lending, and, in particular, in setting lending cut-offs and 
interest rates. One way to assess the economic significance of an increase in AUC is thus to estimate 
the increase in the profitability of the loan portfolio of a medium-sized bank as a result of the use of 
the bankruptcy prediction model that includes group information.  
Using Moody’s KMV global default database, Stein and Jordao (2003) document that the use of a 
default prediction model with higher predictive ability on average leads to a substantial economic 
                                                
32 Note that market-based variables reflect financial statement information. Therefore, the fact that some of the 
accounting-based variables become insignificant as the market information is added to the model does not imply 
that accounting-based variables have no predictive power. 
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benefit for banks. In particular, they document that, by switching to a model with an accuracy ratio 
that is 0.05 higher, banks can increase the profitability of their loan portfolio by 5 basis points.33  
Table 1, Panel B documents an increase of 0.0259 (0.7464 minus 0.7205) in the AUC as 
subsidiary-level information is added to the parent bankruptcy prediction model. Based on Stein and 
Jordao (2003) this increase, which corresponds to a 0.0518 increase in the accuracy ratio, should lead 
to an increase of approximately 5 basis points in the profitability of a bank’s loan portfolio. Similarly, 
the increase of 0.0441 (0.7245 minus 0.6804) in the AUC as parent information is added to the 
subsidiary model (Table 3, Panel B) corresponds to an increase of approximately 9 basis points in the 
profitability of a bank’s loan portfolio. Based on the above, we view the inclusion of group financial 
information in default prediction models as having a sizable impact on predictive power. 
The value of the potential support that a subsidiary is expected to receive from (provide to) its 
parent constitutes an off-balance sheet asset (liability) for that subsidiary. We capture the extent of 
subsidiary off-balance sheet assets and liabilities related to potential group support by examining its 
effect on subsidiary leverage. Our tests build on the idea that the “true” leverage of a subsidiary may 
be different from its “reported” leverage precisely because of these off-balance sheet assets and 
liabilities. By backing out the expected increase/decrease in subsidiary leverage from the change in 
subsidiary default probability induced by a change in parent default risk, we are effectively able to 
indirectly gauge the magnitude of subsidiary off-balance sheet assets and liabilities associated with 
potential parent support.34 Empirically, we find that a 1% increase (decrease) in parent default 
probability produces the same effect on subsidiary default probability as a 1.32% increase (decrease) 
in subsidiary leverage (Table 5, Panel A). The effect of potential parent support on subsidiary 
leverage is stronger for integrated subsidiaries: (i) majority owned subsidiaries (1.42% increase in 
leverage); and (ii) subsidiaries with interlocked boards (1.80% increase in leverage). These findings 
are consistent with more integrated subsidiaries being more likely to receive and provide group 
support. 
                                                
33 AUC=1/2 × (Accuracy Ratio + 1). 
34 We “reverse engineer” the effect of potential parent support on subsidiary leverage in two steps. First, we 
compute the change in subsidiary default probability induced by a 1% change in the default probability of the 
parent. Second, we estimate the percentage change in subsidiary leverage that would produce the exact same 
effect on subsidiary default probability as a 1% change in the default probability of the parent. 
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Next, we examine whether the “true” leverage of a subsidiary is lower (higher) than the reported 
leverage when a subsidiary is expected to provide (receive) group support. We expect high (low) 
credit-risk subsidiaries of low (high) credit-risk parents to be more likely to receive (provide) support. 
Accordingly, in Table 5, Panels B and C we split our sample of parent-subsidiary pairs into four sub-
samples based on parent and subsidiary credit risk. We are particularly interested in the bottom-left 
quadrant (the prop-down sub-sample) and the upper-right quadrant (the prop-up sub-sample).We 
further expect parents’ ability (incentives) to prop down (prop up) to be higher when subsidiaries are 
more integrated within the group. In order to test whether these subsidiaries have higher off-balance 
sheet assets (liabilities) related to group support, we add to our base model, an indicator variable 
capturing subsidiary integration. Using the same empirical strategy as above we find that, compared 
to those that are not, integrated subsidiaries in the prop-down sub-sample exhibit a net off-balance 
sheet asset, corresponding to a reduction in leverage that ranges between 82.57% (for majority 
owned-subsidiaries) and 87.77% (for subsidiaries with interlocked boards). Conversely, integrated 
subsidiaries in the prop-up sub-sample exhibit, compared to those that are not, a net off-balance sheet 
liability, corresponding to an increase in leverage that ranges between 8.95% (for subsidiaries with 
interlocked boards) and 48.13% (for majority owned-subsidiaries). 
 
9. Cross-Sectional Variation in CDS Spreads 
Our findings so far indicate that group information has economically-significant predictive power 
for parent and subsidiary default prediction. The increase in predictive power that we document is 
incremental to a battery of accounting and market variables. We present a graph depicting how 
observed subsidiary bankruptcy rates vary with parent and subsidiary estimated bankruptcy 
probabilities in Figure OA-3 in the Online Appendix. The average observed subsidiary bankruptcy 
rate is increasing in the estimated subsidiary bankruptcy probability (consistent with the default model 
having explanatory power). More interestingly, the average observed subsidiary bankruptcy rate is 
also increasing in the estimated parent bankruptcy probability which is supportive of a group-
affiliation effect.  
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While very costly, bankruptcies are rare events. Hence, they represent “extreme observations” in 
the distribution of default risk. To provide further evidence on the economic significance of our 
findings, and to shed light on whether group affiliation matters for credit-risk assessment also along 
the continuum of the default-risk distribution, we examine whether the usefulness of group 
information extends to the pricing of credit-risk-sensitive securities. Specifically, we test whether 
group information explains cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads (ܮܰሺܥܦܵ5 ௜ܻ,௧	ሻ). We choose to 
focus on CDS contracts because they are the most liquid credit-risk-sensitive securities whose 
availability extends to several countries in our sample. CDS contracts provide insurance against 
default, and thus the main determinant of CDS spreads is the bankruptcy probability of the reference 
obligor.35 Our approach is similar to Bharath and Shumway (2008) who assess whether accounting- 
and market-based information explains default and credit spreads over and above a Merton-based 
distance to default. We describe our CDS Sample and present the results of this analysis in the Online 
Appendix. 
 Consistent with our default prediction analysis, we find that combining subsidiary information 
with parent-level accounting and market information improves the explanatory power of our parent 
credit spread models (Table OA-8, Panel A in the Online Appendix). The average subsidiary 
bankruptcy probability is positive and significant. The adjusted R2 of the parent model increases from 
20% to 30%, 39% to 48%, and 49% to 55% as subsidiary-level information is added to the 
accounting, distance to default, and market models, respectively. Subsidiary-level information 
accounts for 17% to 34% of the models’ explanatory power, as measured by its Shapley R2 value.36 
This suggests that group information is not only incremental to parent-level information for default 
prediction, but it is also (at least in part) taken into account by credit market participants in pricing 
CDS contracts.37 
Similarly, we find that parent and other subsidiary information improves the explanatory 
information of subsidiary CDS models (Table OA-8, Panel B in the Online Appendix). When added 
                                                
35 In fact, assuming market efficiency and risk neutrality, CDS spreads should be equal to the present value of 
the expected loss (the product of the default probability and loss given default). 
36 The Shapley (1953) value is typically used to decompose a regression R2 into the contributions of individual 
regressors (Chevan and Sutherland, 1991; Johnson and LeBreton, 2004). 
37 The structure of our tests does not speak to differences across equity and debt market information pricing.  
28 
 
by itself, the parent bankruptcy probability is always positive and significant. When we add the 
average bankruptcy probability of the other subsidiaries, the parent bankruptcy probability becomes 
insignificant. As we include these two variables, the explanatory power of the accounting, distance to 
default, and market models increases from 15% to 32%, 30% to 45%, and 46% to 59%, respectively. 
The total contribution of these two variables to the models’ R2 ranges from 28% to 52%. 
The fact that the results from the CDS analysis (based on 3,377 parent-year observations and 
1,198 subsidiary-year observations) and the default prediction analysis (based on 310,181 parent-year 
observations and 823,764 subsidiary-year observations) are consistent, notwithstanding differences in 
sample sizes and test designs, provides further reassurance on the relevance of group information in 
predicting and explaining default risk, as well as on the economic significance of our findings.  
 
10. Binary Recursive Partitioning Analysis 
Our discrete hazard model analysis demonstrates the relevance of group information for default 
prediction. However, estimated odds ratios from hazard models do not speak to the relative 
importance among predictors. Moreover, our hazard model analysis may not capture potential non-
linearities and interactions among default predictors. To alleviate this concern and to gauge the 
relative importance of group information for parent and subsidiary default prediction, we use the 
CART methodology developed by Breiman et al. (1984) and applied to the prediction of financial 
distress by Frydman et al. (1985).38  
While CART estimation can accommodate potential non-linearities and better handle outliers, it 
might, at the same time, result in very complex decision trees which over-fit the data and may thus be 
highly unstable. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the AUC may be a less reliable statistic for 
CART than for hazard models, because it is based on a discrete number of nodes. Despite these 
potential limitations, CART estimation allows us to rank different bankruptcy predictors and, 
specifically, to infer the relative importance of group variables vis-à-vis traditional bankruptcy 
predictors used in prior studies. Most importantly, we believe the complementarity of the CART and 
                                                




hazard model approaches reassures us that our findings are not driven by the specificities of a 
particular estimation approach.  
To understand the relative importance of group information for parent default prediction, we first 
apply this technique to all the variables in the base model, i.e., ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, and ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧. We then augment this set of variables with the average bankruptcy 
probability of the group’s subsidiaries (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത) and the subsidiary bankruptcy indicator ( തܻ௦,௧). 
Results of this estimation are reported in Table 6, Panel A. We find that the (out-of-sample) AUC 
improves, the relative error (i.e., the sum of type I and type II errors) decreases and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test-statistic39 increases when group information is added to the base model.40  
In order to evaluate the economic significance of subsidiary-level information for parent default 
prediction, we compute variable importance scores (Table 6, Panel B). These scores measure the 
improvement that can be attributed to a given variable at all tree nodes (both as a primary splitter and 
a surrogate or merely as a primary splitter).41 The variable importance scores are reported on a scale 
of 1 to 100. Leverage is the variable with higher importance (100), followed by the average subsidiary 
bankruptcy probability (87.38). The importance of the average subsidiary bankruptcy probability is 
reduced to 11.40 when we focus solely on its role as primary splitter.  
We present an example of a classification tree with potential splitting variables ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧, ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത, and തܻ௦,௧  in Figure OA-4 in the 
Online Appendix. This tree has been pruned for presentation purposes. The average subsidiary 
bankruptcy probability is one of the primary splitters. 
                                                
39 The Hosmer-Lemeshow test assesses the extent to which the observed default rates match expected default 
rates within the deciles of fitted bankruptcy probability. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic is calculated as 
∑ ൫ை೒ିா೒൯
మ
ே೒గ೒ሺଵିగ೒ሻ௚ீୀଵ , where ௚ܱ,	ܧ௚,	 ௚ܰ and ߨ௚ are observed events, expected events, observations and predicted risk 
for each group ݃ (with ܩ equal to the number of groups). 
40 As previously mentioned, the angularity of the ROC curves, which are based on a small number of final 
nodes, renders the interpretation of the predictive power improvement less straightforward. In particular, 
because AUCs are noisier measures of predictive ability for CART than for hazard models, it becomes harder to 
document increases in AUC in this case. 
41 A primary splitter is a variable that is used to recursively split the sample data in the tree. A surrogate is 
simply a substitute for a primary splitter at a certain node. The surrogate divides the data in a similar way to the 
primary splitter and may thus be used to replace the primary splitter when the primary splitter is missing. 
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We further examine the role of group information in subsidiary default prediction using the 
CART methodology. Table 6, Panel C presents the results of this analysis. We find that both the (out-
of-sample) AUC and the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic increase as information on the parent and 
other subsidiaries is added to the model. Furthermore, the parent bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ) 
and the average bankruptcy probability of other subsidiaries in the same group (ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻ) have 
total variable importance scores of 62.71 and 84.49 (and 13.79 and 23.44 variable importance scores 
as primary splitters).  
We present the classification tree with potential splitting variables including ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧,ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ, ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത, ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത, and ௣ܻ,௧ in Figure 
OA-5 in the Online Appendix. This tree has been pruned for presentation purposes. Both the average 
estimated bankruptcy probability of other subsidiaries and the estimated parent bankruptcy probability 
are primary splitters. 
Overall the results of the CART analysis are consistent with those of the hazard model tests in 
that group-level information has predictive power for both parent and subsidiary default. The fact that 
these two complementary approaches, each with relative advantages and disadvantages, yield 
qualitatively similar results provides support for the role (and economic significance) of group 
information in parent and subsidiary default prediction. 
 
11. Conclusion 
We study whether, and if so to what extent, group affiliation matters for default prediction. Prior 
default prediction studies (cf. Beaver et al., 2010) have typically focused on the firm (and its 
consolidated financial statements) implicitly overlooking the role of group affiliation. 
We document that subsidiary default risk improves parent default prediction over and above 
group-level consolidated information (even when controlling for market information). This finding 
points at a potential loss of credit-relevant information inherent to the accounting consolidation 
process. Moreover, we show that the extent to which within-group information improves the 
predictive power of parent default prediction models is decreasing in the quality of parent-country 
financial reporting transparency. We also find that parent and other group-firms default risk exhibit 
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predictive power for subsidiary default. Lastly, to gauge the relevance and the economic magnitude of 
within-group information, we test whether subsidiary (parent and other group firms) default risk 
explains cross-sectional variation in parent (subsidiary) credit spreads and find support for this 
conjecture. Taken together, our results are in line with the idea that default prediction improves when 
group information is taken into account.  
Our study contributes to the default prediction literature by showing how group information 
improves the predictive power of traditional bankruptcy prediction models and yields important 
insights on the informativeness of consolidated financial statements. By showing that cross-country 
differences in financial infrastructures (e.g., investor protection, reporting enforcement, etc.) affect the 
quality of consolidated financial statements, our findings are of interest to accounting regulators, 
enforcement authorities and auditors. Moreover, our evidence is also relevant to credit suppliers and 
credit rating agencies whose current credit rating assessments incorporate group information on a 
highly-discretionary case-by-case basis. 
While our analysis focuses on the role of business groups’ corporate ultimate owners, future 
studies could examine the importance of the ultimate natural person “behind” a business group, 
whose personal wealth and default risk are likely to influence the possibility of propping distressed 
group firms or, conversely, of tunneling resources from the firm to meet personal debt obligations.42  
                                                
42 Such studies could be conducted, for example, using Danish (e.g., Nanda, 2011) or Swedish (e.g., Becker, 
2006; Lundberg and Waldenstrom, 2017) personal wealth data or, instead, focusing on Finnish personal-default 
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Appendix: Variable Description 
 
Variable (*) Definition 
௜ܻ,௧ାଵ  Indicator variable set equal to one if firm ݅ files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero 
otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧  Indicator variable set equal to one if firm ݅’s return on assets (ܴܱܣ௜,௧) in year ݐ is 
negative, and zero otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧  Return on assets for firm ݅ in year ݐ, defined as net income divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year (Source: Orbis). 
ܮܶܣ௜,௧  Book leverage ratio for firm ݅ in year ݐ, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets 
(Source: Orbis). 
ܧܶܮ௜,௧  Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total liabilities for firm ݅ in year ݐ (Source: 
Orbis). 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ  Natural logarithm of total assets for firm ݅ in year ݐ (Source: Orbis). 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧  Proportion of firms filing for bankruptcy in firm ݅’s country and one-digit SIC industry 
in year ݐ (ranging from zero to 100) (Source: Orbis). 
ܨܩܦܲ ௜݃,௧  Forecasted GDP growth for firm ݅’s country in year ݐ ൅ 1 (Source: IMF). 
ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧  Forecasted inflation for firm ݅’s country in year ݐ ൅ 1 (Source: IMF). 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  The average estimated bankruptcy probability in year ݐ ൅ 1 of all subsidiaries ݏ belonging to the same business group. The bankruptcy probability for each subsidiary ݏ 
is based on the following discrete hazard model: 
ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ሻ, 
estimated for the subsidiary-year observations within the Estimation Sample using an 
expanding window approach (Source: Orbis). 
തܻ௦,௧   Indicator variable set equal to one if at least one of the group subsidiaries ݏ files for 
bankruptcy in year ݐ, and zero otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  The average estimated bankruptcy probability of pseudo-subsidiaries ݏݐ݈݀݊ (i.e., standalone firms) in year ݐ ൅ 1. Each subsidiary ݏ is matched to the median-sized 
standalone firm ݏݐ݈݀݊ in the same country-industry. We estimate bankruptcy 
probabilities for each matched standalone firm based on the following discrete hazard 
model: 
ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܴܱܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܮܶܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܧܶܮ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧ሻ, 
estimated for the standalone-year observations within the Estimation Sample using an 
expanding window approach (Source: Orbis).  
തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧  Indicator variable set equal to one if at least one of the matched standalone firms ݏݐ݈݀݊ 
files for bankruptcy in year ݐ, and zero otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
ܦ2ܦ௜,௧  Distance to default for firm ݅ in year ݐ, calculated following the modification of the 
Merton (1974) model outlined in Duan et al. (2012) (Source: NUS RMI data). 
ܸܱܮ௜,௧  Volatility of daily equity returns for firm ݅ in year ݐ measured over the previous 252 
days (Source: Datastream). 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௜,௧ Relative size of firm ݅ in year ݐ, defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of firm ݅’s 
market capitalization to the total market capitalization of all listed firms in the same 
country and year (Source: Datastream). 
ܴܧ ௜ܶ,௧  Cumulative abnormal returns over the previous 12 months for firm ݅ in year ݐ, where 
monthly abnormal return is defined as the difference between firm ݅’s return and the 






Variable (*) Definition 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  Parent ݌ estimated bankruptcy probability in year ݐ ൅ 1. ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ is based on the 
following discrete hazard model: 
ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ሻ, 
estimated for the parent-year observations within the Estimation Sample using an 
expanding window approach (Source: Orbis). 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  The average estimated bankruptcy probability in year ݐ ൅ 1 of all other subsidiaries ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݏ belonging to the same business group of the respective subsidiary. The 
bankruptcy probability for each subsidiary ݏ is based on the following discrete hazard 
model: 
ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ሻ,  
estimated for the subsidiary-year observations within the Estimation Sample using an 
expanding window approach (Source: Orbis). 
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത  Indicator variable set equal to one if at least one of all other subsidiaries ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݏ belonging to the same business group of the respective subsidiary files for bankruptcy 
in year ݐ, and zero otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
௣ܻ,௧  Indicator variable equal to one if parent ݌ files for bankruptcy in year ݐ, and zero 
otherwise (Source: Orbis). 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ  Pseudo-parent (i.e., standalone firm) ݏݐ݈݀݊’s estimated bankruptcy probability in year ݐ ൅ 1. Each parent ݌ is matched to the median-sized standalone firm ݏݐ݈݀݊ in the 
parent’s country-industry. We estimate bankruptcy probabilities for each matched 
standalone firm based on the following discrete hazard model: 
ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܴܱܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܮܶܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܧܶܮ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧ሻ, 
estimated for the standalone-year observations within the Estimation Sample using an 
expanding window approach (Source: Orbis). 
ܮܰሺܥܦܵ5 ௜ܻ,௧	ሻ Natural logarithm of firm ݅’s spread at the end of year ݐ for a five-year credit default 
swap (CDS) contract on senior unsecured debt. For U.S. firms in the CDS Sample, we 
select U.S. Dollar denominated contracts with a no-restructuring clause for months 
following April 2009, and contracts with a modified restructuring clause for months 
before April 2009. For non-U.S. firms in the CDS Sample, we select, for each month, 
the CDS contract with highest depth (Source: Markit). 
(*) Variables are presented in the order in which they appear in the empirical analyses. Variables generically 





Table 1: Augmented Parent Model 
 
Panel A: Parent Hazard Model 
  Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ  
  All Groups  Consolidated  Non-Financials 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept  -5.379*** -6.023*** -5.965***  -5.725*** -6.185*** -6.056***  -5.584*** -6.248*** -6.222*** 
 (-19.15) (-20.00) (-15.93)  (-5.98) (-6.29) (-6.30)  (-13.08) (-12.48) (-12.30) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  (+) 0.315*** 0.246** 0.255**  0.258* 0.289** 0.309**  0.353** 0.255* 0.255* 
 (2.65) (2.30) (2.42)  (1.65) (2.45) (2.00)  (2.42) (1.95) (1.94) 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  (–) -2.547*** -1.972*** -1.984***  -3.754** -2.823** -3.102***  -2.859*** -2.555*** -2.546*** 
 (-7.67) (-8.23) (-7.14)  (-2.54) (-2.36) (-2.83)  (-8.84) (-11.26) (-11.31) 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  (+) 1.566*** 1.394*** 1.446***  2.133*** 2.023*** 2.095***  1.782*** 1.676*** 1.673*** 
 (14.28) (7.32) (6.58)  (3.80) (3.70) (3.78)  (8.49) (6.02) (5.99) 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  (–) -0.139 -0.111 -0.144  0.513* 0.502 0.577  -0.109 -0.118 -0.119 
 (-0.95) (-0.82) (-0.99)  (1.91) (1.54) (1.24)  (-0.47) (-0.55) (-0.56) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  (–) -0.057* -0.027 -0.039  -0.093 -0.071 -0.088  -0.049 -0.018 -0.022 
 (-1.84) (-0.90) (-1.22)  (-1.31) (-0.95) (-1.18)  (-1.19) (-0.43) (-0.50) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  (+) 0.094 0.167** 0.164**  0.055 0.158*** 0.150***  0.073 0.146** 0.143** 
 (0.72) (2.22) (2.15)  (1.57) (3.27) (3.44)  (0.87) (2.09) (2.09) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)  85.473*** 86.826***   58.677*** 55.664***   80.086*** 79.839*** 
   (5.20) (4.90)   (9.40) (9.02)   (4.85) (4.86) 
തܻ௦,௧   (+)  0.699***    0.808***    0.477*** 
  (7.56)    (4.62)    (5.93) 
Marginal Effects:             
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത    0.206 0.201   0.130 0.118   0.186 0.185 തܻ௦,௧       0.075    0.103    0.042 




Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Predictive Ability 
  All Groups  Consolidated  Non-Financials 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Model (1) 
0 36.03 23.46 9.19  39.14 29.98 9.35  37.65 24.66 9.05 
1 16.34 19.45 9.54  13.94 19.86 9.74  17.99 20.38 9.45 
2 10.83 14.20 9.82  10.46 12.85 9.93  11.73 15.53 9.73 
Total 63.20 57.11 28.55  63.54 62.69 29.03  67.38 60.57 28.00 
AUC 0.7205    0.7181    0.7439   
Model (2) 
0 36.11 23.80 9.17  40.21 31.41 9.31  38.62 24.81 9.04 
1 17.79 19.80 9.52  13.94 19.40 9.75  17.86 21.07 9.42 
2 9.98 14.59 9.81  10.19 13.69 9.91  10.96 15.52 9.74 
Total 63.89 58.19 28.50  64.34 64.50 28.98  67.44 61.40 28.19 
AUC  0.7464    0.7301    0.7636   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000    0.0013    0.0000   
 0 35.87 23.49 9.19  39.14 30.50 9.34  38.94 24.60 9.04 
 1 18.08 19.28 9.53  13.40 19.21 9.76  17.99 21.46 9.40 
Model (3) 2 9.94 14.82 9.80  11.26 13.69 9.91  10.51 15.45 9.75 
 Total 63.89 57.59 28.52  63.81 63.40 29.01  67.44 61.50 28.19 
 AUC 0.7470    0.7289    0.7641   
 p-value (vs. Model (2)) 0.2119    0.1847    0.3087   
This table presents the results of the parent default prediction analysis. Panel A reports coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of a discrete hazard 
model for the Base Model Sample of parent firm-years. The dependent variable is equal to one if the parent files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. The model 
specification presented in Column (1) includes parent-level financial ratios only: ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ሻ, Column 
(2) adds the average estimated bankruptcy probability of all group subsidiaries (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത) and Column (3) adds an indicator variable ( തܻ௦,௧) set equal to one if any of the 
group subsidiaries files for bankruptcy in year ݐ, and zero otherwise. The number of observations decreases in Columns (2) and (3) due to data availability requirements on 
subsidiary bankruptcy information. In Columns (4) to (6) the sample is limited to parents for which consolidated financial statements are available and to subsidiaries that are 
consolidated, i.e., in which the parent’s control rights are equal to, or higher than, 50%. In Columns (7) to (9) parents that are financial institutions are excluded. Marginal 
effects for group-level variables are reported as the change in estimated bankruptcy probability as each of the group-level variables increases by one standard deviation, 
scaled by the average estimated bankruptcy probability. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent-country and year level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel B presents a comparison between the predictive power of the augmented models and 
that of the base model reported in Column (1) using a constant sample. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the percentage of bankrupt years, years before bankruptcy and non-
bankrupt firm-years falling in each of the top three deciles. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) is also reported for each subgroup. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The subscripts ݌ and ݏ are used to identify parent- and subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
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Table 2: Augmented Parent Model by Financial Reporting Transparency Country Cluster 
 
Panel A: Parent Hazard Model 
 Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Financial Reporting Transparency 
 High  Low 
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept  -8.321*** -9.005*** -5.595*** -6.311*** 
 (-8.66) (-8.57) (-6.27) (-6.75) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  (+) 0.309 0.402 0.228 0.138 
 (0.65) (1.17) (1.02) (0.55) 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  (–) -4.604** -3.406* -4.635*** -3.839** 
 (-2.36) (-1.86) (-2.82) (-2.50) 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  (+) 3.270*** 3.228*** 1.727*** 1.789*** 
 (3.66) (3.49) (2.61) (3.03) 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  (–) 0.196 0.086 0.256 0.289 
 (1.47) (0.40) (0.91) (0.91) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  (–) -0.000 0.040 -0.061 -0.056 
 (-0.00) (0.65) (-0.88) (-0.74) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  (+) 0.116** 0.196*** 0.183* 0.556** 
 (2.33) (3.92) (1.79) (2.07) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)  46.376***  91.327*** 
   (5.55)  (8.82) 
Marginal Effects:     
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത    0.076  0.180 
Obs.  48,907 38,526 37,590 31,960 
 
 
Panel B: Predictive Ability 
  Financial Reporting Transparency 
  High   Low 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Model (1) 
0 51.75 39.44 9.31  37.04 22.68 9.40 
1 16.67 22.10 9.75  10.70 16.48 9.81 
2 9.65 11.33 9.98  9.47 13.16 9.92 
Total 78.07 72.87 29.04  57.20 52.32 29.13 
AUC 0.8094    0.7196   
Model (2) 
0 50.88 40.56 9.29  38.27 24.67 9.33 
1 21.93 21.54 9.75  11.11 15.38 9.84 
2 5.26 11.19 10.00  10.70 13.39 9.90 
Total 78.07 73.29 29.03  60.08 53.43 29.07 
AUC  0.8139    0.7316   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.2540    0.0228   
This table presents the results of the parent default prediction analysis for high and low financial reporting transparency 
country clusters. In this analysis, the Base Model Sample is limited to parents for which consolidated financial 
statements are available and to subsidiaries that are consolidated, i.e., in which the parent’s control rights are equal to, 
or higher than, 50%. We classify a country as having high (low) financial reporting transparency if it falls in the Leuz 
(2010) institutional clusters 1 or 2 (3, 4, or 5). Panel A reports coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the 
estimation of the base and augmented discrete hazard models for the sub-samples of parent firms from high and low 
financial reporting transparency country clusters. The dependent variable is equal to one if the parent files for 
bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects for group-level variables are reported as the change in 
estimated bankruptcy probability as each of the group-level variables increases by one standard deviation, scaled by the 
average estimated bankruptcy probability. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent-country 
and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Panel B presents a comparison between the predictive power of the base and augmented models within each country 
cluster group. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the percentage of bankrupt years, years before bankruptcy and non-
bankrupt firm-years falling in each of the top three deciles. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
Curve (AUC) is also reported for each sample partition, as is the p-value for the increase in the AUC in the augmented 
model. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The subscripts ݌ and ݏ are used to identify parent- and subsidiary-
level variables, respectively. 
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Table 3: Augmented Subsidiary Model 
 
Panel A: Subsidiary Hazard Model 
  Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  -3.995*** -4.574*** -4.975*** -4.411*** -4.948*** -3.952*** 
 (-7.10) (-7.49) (-8.85) (-7.36) (-8.80) (-7.19) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.355*** 0.284*** 0.244*** 0.275*** 0.248*** 0.329*** 
 (8.60) (8.35) (4.06) (5.08) (4.08) (6.10) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -0.816*** -0.800*** -0.734*** -0.803*** -0.737*** -0.813*** 
 (-6.62) (-6.00) (-4.21) (-5.16) (-4.64) (-6.36) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 0.440*** 0.280*** 0.243** 0.292*** 0.251*** 0.446*** 
 (5.11) (3.17) (2.52) (3.52) (2.74) (5.42) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) -0.215*** -0.164*** -0.148*** -0.154*** -0.139** -0.215*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.48) (-2.73) (-2.79) (-2.51) (-3.65) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) -0.125*** -0.091** -0.087** -0.109*** -0.091*** -0.128*** 
 (-3.61) (-2.48) (-2.51) (-3.09) (-2.68) (-3.85) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ (+) 0.092 0.108* 0.107* 0.112* 0.103* 0.098 
 (1.41) (1.74) (1.83) (1.79) (1.73) (1.37) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  (+)  133.018*** 87.766*** 136.977*** 84.110***   
  (5.58) (6.41) (5.21) (5.47)   
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)    109.048***   111.431***   
    (5.72)   (5.75)   
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത  (+)      1.214*** 2.017*** 1.542*** 
       (7.77) (5.73) (14.99) 
௣ܻ,௧   (+)          1.190*** 
           (6.53) 
Marginal Effects:        
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ    0.268 0.158 0.255 0.149  
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത     0.219  0.222  
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത      0.039 0.043 0.058 
௣ܻ,௧         0.108 





Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Predictive Ability 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3) 
Model (1) 
0 25.13 17.87 9.38 
1 15.86 14.68 9.67 
2 11.69 13.13 9.81 
Total 52.68 45.68 28.87 
AUC 0.6804   
Model (2) 
0 24.37 18.51 9.36 
1 16.72 15.08 9.64 
2 12.46 13.11 9.80 
Total 53.55 46.69 28.80 
AUC 0.7245   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000   
Model (3) 
0 25.12 18.30 9.36 
1 16.07 15.05 9.65 
2 12.78 12.90 9.81 
Total 53.97 46.25 28.82 
AUC 0.7350   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000   
 0 24.76 18.44 9.36 
 1 16.51 15.01 9.65 
Model (4) 2 12.28 13.15 9.80 
 Total 53.55 46.60 28.81 
 AUC 0.7264   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000   
 0 25.38 18.35 9.35 
 1 15.93 14.91 9.66 
Model (5) 2 12.75 13.01 9.80 
 Total 54.07 46.27 28.82 
 AUC 0.7367   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000   
 0 25.30 17.90 9.38 
 1 15.93 14.76 9.67 
Model (6) 2 11.77 12.97 9.82 
 Total 53.00 45.62 28.87 
 AUC  0.6841   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0000   
This table presents the results of the subsidiary default prediction analysis. Panels A reports coefficients and (in 
parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of a discrete hazard model for the Base Model Sample of subsidiary firm-
years in which only the parent with the highest percentage of control in each subsidiary is retained. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if the subsidiary files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. The specification 
presented in Column (1) includes subsidiary-level financial ratios only: ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ሻ. Column (2) adds the parent’s estimated bankruptcy 
probability (Pr	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ), Column (3) adds the average estimated bankruptcy probability of the other group subsidiaries 
(ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത), and Columns (4) to (6) respectively add indicators for whether the parent, or one of the other group 
subsidiaries, file for bankruptcy in year ݐ ( ௣ܻ,௧	and ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത). The number of observations decreases in Columns (2) to 
(6) due to data availability requirements on parent and other subsidiaries bankruptcy information. Marginal effects for 
group-level variables are reported as the change in estimated bankruptcy probability as each of the group-level 
variables increases by one standard deviation, scaled by the average estimated bankruptcy probability. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary-country and year level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel B presents a comparison 
between the predictive power of the augmented models and that of the base model reported in Column (1) using a 
constant sample. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the percentage of bankruptcy years, years before bankruptcy and 
non-bankrupt firm-years falling in each of the top three deciles. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
Curve (AUC) is also reported for each subgroup. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The subscripts ݌ and ݏ are 
used to identify parent- and subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
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Table 4: Augmented Subsidiary Model - Resource Sharing and Common Business Exposure 
 
Panel A: Parent-Subsidiary Resource Sharing 
 Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Subsidiary Named After Its Parent 
 Parent Has Specialized 
Knowledge 
 Domestic Subsidiary  Subsidiary Industry Same As Parent Industry 
 No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept  -4.705*** -4.098*** -4.621*** -4.500*** -3.511*** -4.770*** -4.645*** -4.314*** 
 (-7.24) (-10.16) (-7.36) (-7.72) (-6.43) (-7.58) (-7.72) (-6.85) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.291*** 0.194 0.329*** 0.202*** 0.245** 0.289*** 0.322*** 0.123 
 (7.08) (.) (7.45) (4.66) (2.19) (8.04) (9.23) (1.47) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -0.846*** -0.662** -0.770*** -0.836*** -0.134 -0.936*** -0.811*** -0.750*** 
 (-8.30) (-2.06) (-4.66) (-4.16) (-0.85) (-6.27) (-4.87) (-6.40) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 0.333*** 0.030 0.300*** 0.253*** 0.161** 0.306*** 0.303*** 0.188 
 (3.82) (0.23) (2.93) (3.01) (2.29) (3.15) (3.82) (1.39) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) -0.186*** -0.068 -0.225*** -0.089** -0.196** -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.168** 
 (-3.47) (-1.42) (-3.10) (-2.15) (-2.16) (-3.08) (-4.30) (-2.14) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) -0.076* -0.140*** -0.090** -0.092*** -0.180*** -0.077** -0.086** -0.110*** 
 (-1.93) (-7.04) (-2.19) (-3.19) (-5.28) (-1.98) (-2.30) (-3.45) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ (+) 0.115* 0.075 0.113* 0.102* 0.023 0.180*** 0.105* 0.123** 
 (1.89) (1.12) (1.68) (1.82) (0.53) (2.72) (1.67) (2.02) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  (+) 133.169*** 134.128*** 131.726*** 135.281*** 112.727*** 133.753*** 133.475*** 133.329*** 
   (5.35) (6.05) (5.45) (5.60) (3.80) (5.28) (5.39) (5.98) 
Marginal Effects:        
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ   0.268 0.270 0.266 0.271 0.197 0.271 0.263 0.289 

























AUC 0.7223 0.7025 0.7210 0.7205 0.6714 0.7294 0.7216 0.7159 
AUC (Comp. Model) 0.6791 0.6619 0.6813 0.6739 0.6518 0.6822 0.6800 0.6701 
p-value (vs. Comp. Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
% Top Three Deciles 53.77 53.56 54.32 53.73 50.04 54.47 54.39 51.71 
% Top Three Deciles (Comp. Model) 53.47 51.40 54.12 51.88 48.97 53.75 53.82 50.98 




Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Parent-Subsidiary Common Business Exposure 
 Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Parent Major Supplier  Parent Major Customer  High Common Business Exposure 
 No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Intercept  -4.682*** -4.416*** -4.627*** -4.466*** -4.663*** -4.456*** 
 (-7.22) (-7.62) (-6.98) (-7.82) (-6.90) (-7.83) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.347*** 0.196*** 0.326*** 0.212*** 0.335*** 0.222*** 
 (24.15) (3.48) (10.12) (4.70) (8.84) (5.32) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -0.723*** -0.831*** -0.759*** -0.791*** -0.730*** -0.813*** 
 (-5.34) (-5.24) (-10.44) (-4.69) (-11.50) (-4.71) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 0.314*** 0.217** 0.307*** 0.220** 0.311*** 0.228** 
 (3.67) (2.17) (3.72) (1.98) (3.47) (2.27) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) -0.192*** -0.107*** -0.216*** -0.084* -0.192*** -0.116*** 
 (-3.73) (-3.11) (-4.09) (-1.71) (-2.98) (-3.44) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) -0.079* -0.106*** -0.087** -0.099*** -0.082* -0.101*** 
 (-1.78) (-3.55) (-2.00) (-3.25) (-1.76) (-3.40) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ (+) 0.103* 0.122* 0.104 0.123** 0.099 0.124* 
 (1.67) (1.91) (1.62) (1.99) (1.60) (1.94) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  (+) 132.500*** 133.336*** 134.381*** 131.208*** 134.959*** 131.130*** 
   (5.42) (5.54) (5.31) (5.64) (5.46) (5.49) 
Marginal Effects:   
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ   0.264 0.278  0.264 0.278  0.268 0.273 



















AUC 0.7213 0.7158 0.7275 0.7088 0.7258 0.7128 
AUC (Comp. Model) 0.6799 0.6697 0.6859 0.6625 0.6834 0.6680 
p-value (vs. Comp. Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
% Top Three Deciles 54.82 52.08 55.35 51.43  55.45 51.94 
% Top Three Deciles (Comp. Model) 54.05 51.54 54.67 50.78  54.43 51.43 
Obs.  364,459 386,442  391,930 358,971  322,989 427,912 
This table presents the results of the analysis assessing the role of parent-subsidiary resource sharing and common business exposure for subsidiary default prediction. In this analysis, the 
Base Model Sample is limited to observations for which data on partitioning variables are available. Panel A presents sample partitions based on different proxies capturing the extent of 
parent-subsidiary resource sharing: whether the subsidiary is named after its parent (Columns (1) and (2)), whether the parent has specialized knowledge (Columns (3) and (4)), whether the 
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subsidiary is domestic (Columns (5) and (6)), and whether the subsidiary is in the same industry as the parent (Columns (7) and (8)). A parent is classified as having specialized knowledge 
if it operates in industries generating specialized knowledge. Industries with a high and low degree of specialized knowledge are identified following a similar approach to Christie et al. 
(2003). Panel B presents sample partitions based on different proxies capturing the extent of common business exposure: whether the parent is a major supplier of its subsidiary (Columns 
(1) and (2)), whether the parent is a major customer of its subsidiary (Columns (3) and (4)), and whether the subsidiary has high business exposure to its parent (Columns (5) and (6)). 
Following Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013), we identify major customers and suppliers using the input-output matrix. A parent is classified as a major supplier of its subsidiary if the 
purchases made by the subsidiary’s industry from the parent’s industry represent more than 2% of the total purchases made by the subsidiary industry. A parent is classified as a major 
customer of its subsidiary if the purchases made by the parent’s industry from the subsidiary’s industry represent more than 2% of the total output of the subsidiary industry. A subsidiary is 
classified as having high business exposure to its parent if the parent is classified as being either a major supplier or a major customer of the subsidiary. Both Panel A and B report 
coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of the discrete hazard model reported in Table 3, Panel A, Column (2) for the different subsidiary sub-samples. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the subsidiary files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects for group-level variables are reported as the change in estimated 
default probability as each of the group-level variables increases by one standard deviation, scaled by the average estimated default probability. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered at the subsidiary-country and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The table also presents a 
comparison between the predictive power of the models presented and that of the base model reported in Table 3, Panel A, Column (1) and re-estimated within each sub-sample. We use a 
constant sample for predictive power comparisons. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The subscripts ݌ and ݏ are used to identify parent- and subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
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Table 5: Gauging the Financial Impact of Group Affiliation 
 
Panel A: Percentage Change in Subsidiary Leverage Equivalent to 1% Change in Parent Default 
Probability  
 Full Sample 
 Majority-Owned 
Subsidiary 
 Subsidiary with 
Interlocked Board 
  No Yes  No Yes 
% Change in ܮܶܣ௦,௧ 
Equivalent to 








Panel B: Majority-Owned Subsidiaries 
% Change in ܮܶܣ௦,௧ 
Equivalent to Change in Subsidiary Control Rights 
for Different Parent-Subsidiary Credit-Risk Conditions 
 
 



















Panel C: Subsidiaries with Interlocked Boards 
% Change in ܮܶܣ௦,௧ 
Equivalent to Change in Interlocked Board 
for Different Parent-Subsidiary Credit-Risk Conditions 
 



















This table provides estimates of the relative magnitude of off-balance sheet assets and liabilities associated with group 
support. Panel A reports the percentage change in subsidiary leverage (ܮܶܣ௦,௧) that produces the same effect on the 
subsidiary default probability as a 1% change in the default probability of the parent (ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ). Our estimation 
entails two steps. First, we compute the change in subsidiary default probability induced by a 1% change in the default 
probability of the parent, based on the model reported in Table 3, Panel A. Second, we estimate the percentage change 
in subsidiary leverage that would produce the exact same effect on subsidiary default probability as a 1% change in the 
default probability of the parent. Next, we examine cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the subsidiary leverage 
effect based on the degree of subsidiary integration, which is measured along two dimensions: (i) whether the parent has 
majority ownership rights; (ii) whether parent and subsidiary boards are interlocked. In Panels B and C parent-
subsidiary pairs are split into four sub-samples based on parent and subsidiary credit risk (parents/subsidiaries are 
classified as having high (low) credit risk if their respective leverage is above (below) the sample median). The prop-
down sub-sample (bottom-left quadrant) comprises high credit-risk subsidiaries of low credit-risk parents and the prop-
up sub-sample (upper-right quadrant) comprises low credit-risk subsidiaries of high credit-risk parents. Within each 
quadrant we report the incremental effect on leverage for integrated subsidiaries vis-à-vis non-integrated subsidiaries.
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Table 6: Binary Recursive Partitioning Analysis 
 
Panel A: Parent Model Predictive Ability 
 Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Base Model Augmented Model 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables: 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧, Prሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതത, തܻ௦,௧  
AUC (Learning sample) 0.7782 0.7793 
AUC (Test sample) 0.7512 0.7525 
Relative cost 0.5831 0.5817 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test-statistic (p-value) 60.77 (0.0000) 115.75 (0.0000) 
 
Panel B: Parent Model Variable Importance (%) 
 Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Base Model Augmented Model 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables: Total Primary Splitters Total Primary Splitters 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣   43.50 5.88 42.83 6.12 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  85.83 97.29 85.90 100.00 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  100.00 38.81 100.00 42.04 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧   54.91 4.82 54.64 4.92 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  15.41 7.73 15.46 7.61 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ 76.91 100.00 73.82 98.27 




Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Subsidiary Model Predictive Ability 
 Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Base Model Augmented Model 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables: ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧,Prሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ, Prሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത, ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത, ௣ܻ,௧ 
AUC (Learning sample) 0.7807 0.7848 
AUC (Test sample) 0.7495 0.7510 
Relative cost 0.5955 0.5956 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test-statistic (p-value) 60.77 (0.0000) 115.75 (0.0000) 
 
Panel D: Subsidiary Model Variable Importance (%) 
 Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 Base Model Augmented Model 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables: Total Primary Splitters Total Primary Splitters 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  20.84 2.13 19.98 1.63 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  70.24 5.43 72.80 17.32 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  40.91 14.78 40.05 11.75 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  64.64 34.03 67.66 24.56 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  27.15 9.82 28.96 7.02 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ    62.71 13.79 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത    84.49 23.44 
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത     1.84 1.52 
௣ܻ,௧      0.93 0.00 
This table reports the results of a binary recursive partitioning analysis for the one-year ahead probability of parent (Panels A and B) and subsidiary (Panels C and D) bankruptcy 
for the Base Model Sample of parent and subsidiary firm-years. We use the Classification and Regression Trees methodology (CART) (Breiman et al., 1984) to create a decision 
tree that classifies firm-years into bankrupt or non-bankrupt. We follow the Gini rule to choose the optimal split at each node of the tree. Based on this approach, we generate the 
maximal tree and a set of sub-trees. We then use 10-fold cross-validation to estimate the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC). Panels A and C report 
summary statistics for the predictive ability of the parent and subsidiary models, respectively. Relative cost is the sum of the percentage of type I and type II errors. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test statistic is calculated as ∑ ൫ை೒ିா೒൯
మ
ே೒గ೒ሺଵିగ೒ሻ௚ீୀଵ , where ௚ܱ,	ܧ௚,	 ௚ܰ	and ߨ௚ are observed events, expected events, observations and predicted risk for each group ݃ (with ܩ 
equal to the number of groups). Panels B and D present the importance scores for the variables included in the parent and subsidiary augmented models. These scores are 
calculated as the sum of the improvement that can be attributed to a given variable at each node of the tree. Total variable importance takes into account the role of the variable as 
a surrogate, while the column Primary Splitters only takes into account the role of the variable as a primary splitter. 
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1. Dataset Construction 
We combine several vintages of Orbis data in order to maximize coverage and to accurately 
identify bankruptcies. These vintages, collectively labelled by BvDEP as Orbis Historical, reflect the 
content of the Orbis database at different points in time. 
We start by identifying “Global Ultimate Owners” (GUOs). As discussed by Faccio and Lang 
(2002), the identification of ultimate owners generally proves extremely difficult. In line with the 
recent study by Shroff et al. (2014), we follow the Orbis criteria to identify ultimate owners. These are 
independent firms where no single shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares.1, 2 For each GUO 
(parent company), we then obtain subsidiary information from the Orbis ownership files. We first 
retrieve subsidiaries that are directly held by their respective GUOs (level 1 subsidiaries), and then we 
iterate this process for four additional levels (level 2, 3, 4, and 5 subsidiaries) following the sequential 
approach used in other studies such as Shroff et al. (2014) and Beuselinck et al. (2018). For each 
parent-subsidiary pair, we compute control rights using the weakest link approach (La Porta et al., 
1999; Claessens et al., 2000; and Nenova, 2003). We eliminate parents and subsidiaries whose Orbis 
legal form is labelled as “Other legal form.” This effectively excludes cooperatives from the sample.3 
We further delete firms with U.S. SIC codes 8000-9999. These include industries, such as Museums 
and educational services, Private households, Membership organizations (SIC codes 8000-8999) and 
Public services (SIC codes 9000-9999). Finally, we delete firms that do not have assets and turnover 
of at least U.S. $10,000 for at least one of the years 2004-2012 and with missing net income or EBIT 
information for all of these years. 
Based on historical financial data, we build an eight-year time series of bankruptcy data (2005-
2012) for each parent and subsidiary in the sample, as well as for a set of standalone (i.e., non-group-
                                                
1 Our objective is to examine whether parent (subsidiary) financial information has incremental predictive 
power for subsidiary (parent) default, and therefore our analysis is necessarily limited to parent firms with 
available financial statement information, i.e., corporate ultimate owners. 
2 In untabulated tests, we check the sensitivity of our findings to alternative thresholds. Specifically, we re-map 
our parent-subsidiary corporate ownership chains using the two alternative thresholds of 20% and 10% used in 
prior studies (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002). The 
results of these robustness tests yield qualitatively similar inferences to those presented in the paper. 




affiliated) firms meeting similar requirements.4 We identify bankrupt firms using the status variable 
from Orbis.5 In particular, we classify as bankrupt firms with the following statuses: “Active 
(Insolvency proceedings),” “Bankruptcy,” “Dissolved,” “Dissolved (bankruptcy),” “Dissolved 
(litigation),” “In liquidation,” and “Inactive (no precision).” Because insolvency procedures and 
bankruptcy regulations typically vary across countries, throughout the paper we use the term 
bankruptcy loosely and often refer to the more generic term default. We create a bankruptcy firm-year 
indicator equal to one if the firm goes bankrupt (as per the above definition) in a given year.  
Following Shumway (2001), we delete all firm-years after bankruptcy from the sample. We use the 
field status date to identify the year in which the firm becomes bankrupt. If the status date is missing, 
we set it equal to the first year in which the firm status changes to bankrupt. 
 
2. Discrete Hazard Model vs. CART 
The Classification and Regression Tree (CART) methodology builds classification trees which 
are structured as a sequence of nodes, where the data are recursively split into more homogeneous 
subsets using the Gini rule. The predicted classification is determined following the path down the 
tree to an end node, where the path depends on the values of the different predictors.  
An interesting feature of the CART methodology, vis-à-vis discrete hazard estimation, is the 
possibility to directly compare the relative contribution of each default predictor. However, the CART 
methodology is not free of limitations, with the main flaw being its sensitivity to small changes in the 
learning data. The entire tree structure can in fact change if the first splitting variable and cut-point are 
chosen differently, and these choices strongly depend on the distribution of observations in the 
learning sample. Moreover, because trees have a discrete number of end nodes, the resulting Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are typically based on a smaller number of points compared to 
hazard model ROC curves which are instead based on continuous bankruptcy probability estimates. 
As a result of the angularity of CART-based ROC curves, the resulting Area Under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) may be a less reliable statistic. 
 
                                                
4 Because we require lagged financial ratios for our analysis, we lose observations for the year 2004. 
5 By compiling status data from several annual editions of Orbis, we effectively construct a time-series status 
variable starting in 2005 and ending in 2012. 
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3. Default Prediction Model Validation 
We compare the predictive power of different default prediction models for parent, subsidiary, 
and standalone firms in our Estimation Sample (see Table OA-2, Panel A). Following Shumway 
(2001), we use a discrete hazard model and include three types of observations in the estimation: non-
bankrupt firms, years before bankruptcy for bankrupt firms and bankruptcy year. Our dependent 
variable, ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ, is equal to one if firm ݅ files for bankruptcy within one year (ݐ ൅ 1), and zero 
otherwise. We retain the first bankruptcy filing and remove from the sample all years after this filing. 
Furthermore, to ensure that prediction is made out-of-sample, and to avoid the potential bias of ex 
post over-fitting the data, we estimate coefficients using an expanding window approach. We compare 
four model specifications: 
1) The BCM (2012) model, augmented by the natural logarithm of the book value of assets: 
ܲݎ൫ ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܧܶܮ௜,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻሻ, (OA.1)
where ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ is an indicator variable set equal to one if firm ݅ files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, 
and zero otherwise; ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ is an indicator variable set equal to one if firm ݅’s return on assets 
in year ݐ is negative, and zero otherwise; ܴܱܣ௜,௧ is firm ݅’s return on assets in year ݐ; ܮܶܣ௜,௧ is 
firm ݅’s book leverage in year ݐ, i.e., firm ݅’s total liabilities scaled by total assets; ܧܶܮ௜,௧ is firm 
݅’s ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total liabilities in year ݐ; and ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of assets for firm ݅ in year ݐ. 
2) A country/industry/time varying baseline model (i.e., equation (OA.1) augmented by the 
bankruptcy rate in firm ݅’s country-industry in the year ݐ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧): 
ܲݎ൫ ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܧܶܮ௜,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ሻ. (OA.2)
3) A macro model (i.e., equation (OA.2) augmented forecasted GDP growth and inflation for the 
year ݐ ൅ 1): 
ܲݎ൫ ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܧܶܮ௜,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧, ܨܩܦܲ݃௜,௧, ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧ሻ, (OA.3)
where ܨܩܦܲ݃௜,௧	and  ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧ are the last forecasts of GDP growth and inflation for firm ݅’s 
country in year ݐ ൅ 1  issued in year ݐ.  
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4) A model with country and industry fixed effects (i.e., equation (OA.1) augmented by country and 
one-digit SIC industry indicators): 
ܲݎ൫ ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂൫ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܧܶܮ௜,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ, ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ ܨܧ, ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ ܨܧ൯, (OA.4)
where ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ	ܨܧ and ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ	ܨܧ are a series of (one-digit SIC) industry and country fixed 
effects. 
Table OA-1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in these four models. 
Parents are on average more profitable and have lower leverage than subsidiaries (they exhibit lower 
incidence of losses,	ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, higher ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and lower ܮܶܣ௜,௧ on average). Subsidiaries, despite 
having lower ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and higher ܮܶܣ௜,௧, have higher earnings relative to total liabilities, as measured 
by ܧܶܮ௜,௧. Standalones have on average lower book value of assets and higher ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and ܧܶܮ௜,௧ than 
both parents and subsidiaries. Consistent with the observed financial ratios, subsidiaries exhibit the 
highest bankruptcy rates out of the three groups of firms (1.17%), followed by parents (0.87%) and 
standalones (0.51%). 
Panel B presents the coefficients from the estimation of models (OA.1) to (OA.4). These models 
are estimated separately for parents, subsidiaries and standalones. Across the four models, parents and 
subsidiaries with low	profitability, losses and high leverage are more likely to file for bankruptcy in 
the following year. While ܧܶܮ௜,௧ is not significant in the parent model, it is significantly negative for 
subsidiaries, as expected.  ܮܶܣ௜,௧, ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ are the main predictors of standalone 
bankruptcy, with size exhibiting a positive coefficient, in contrast to the coefficient documented for 
parents and subsidiaries. While not statistically significant, the coefficient on the country-industry 
bankruptcy rate is positive. Forecasted GDP growth (forecasted inflation) exhibit positive (negative) 
and significant associations with future parent bankruptcy but are not statistically significant for 
subsidiaries and standalones. We estimate the probability that each firm in the sample files for 
bankruptcy within the following 12 months as follows:	ܲݎ൫ పܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯෣ ൌ ௘௫௣	ሺ௑೔,೟ఉ෡ሻଵା௘௫௣	ሺ௑೔,೟ఉ෡ሻ.  
We compare the predictive power of the models using two different approaches. First, we rank 
the predicted probability of bankruptcy within the parent, subsidiaries and standalones sub-samples. 
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We report the percentage of parents, subsidiaries and standalones in each of the top three deciles 
separately for three groups: (1) bankruptcy years, (2) years before bankruptcy and (3) non-bankrupt 
firm-years. If the models were to have no predictive power, the fraction of observations in each decile 
would be 10% for each of the three groups. A higher percentage of bankruptcy years in the top three 
deciles would be indicative of higher predictive power of the model. Second, we perform a ROC 
curve analysis and report the AUC, which reflects the trade-off between type 1 and type 2 
classification errors. A strategy that randomly classifies firm-years as bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
would be represented by the diagonal of the ROC graph and have an AUC of 0.5. A perfect 
classification strategy would be represented by a point on the upper left corner of the ROC graph 
(AUC=1), while a strategy that classifies  all observations as “non-bankrupt” would be represented by 
a point in the origin of the ROC graph, and have an AUC of zero. We use these two approaches to 
examine predictive power as both have advantages and disadvantages. The AUC has the advantage of 
providing a concise measure of the relative frequency of false positives and negatives. However, it has 
the disadvantage of implicitly assuming a symmetric loss function by placing equal weight on the two 
types of errors. The decile analysis has the advantage of illustrating these errors in more detail across 
the distribution of the estimated probability of bankruptcy, which is informative, given that the loss 
function in bankruptcy classification is likely asymmetric (Beaver et al., 2010). The disadvantage of 
the decile analysis, however, is that it does not provide a summary measure of predictive power across 
the entire distribution. 
Panels C and D present the results of this analysis. Column (1) presents the percentage of 
bankrupt firm-years that fall within the top three deciles of the predicted probability of bankruptcy for 
each of the four models. Columns (2) and (3) show the percentage of years before bankruptcy and 
non-bankrupt firm-years falling within these deciles, respectively. The AUC of the 
country/industry/time varying baseline model (equation (OA.2)) is higher than that of other models 
for subsidiaries and standalone firms. While slightly smaller than the AUC of the macro model for 
parents, the difference between the two is not statistically significant (Panel D). Approximately 30% 
(23%) of the parent (subsidiary) bankruptcy years fall into the top decile of predicted probability of 
bankruptcy, and 60% (50%) fall into the top three deciles. Figure OA-1, Panels A, B and C present 
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the ROC curves for the different models. Consistent with the reported AUC, the country/industry/time 
varying model appears to outperform the other three models for subsidiaries and standalone firms and 
the difference between that model and the other models appears negligible for parents. For the above 
reason, we use the country/industry/time varying baseline model (equation (OA.2)) as the main model 
for our analysis. 
Panel E, further examines the differences in predictive power for the selected model across 
public and private firms. We estimate the model both within the pooled Estimation Sample and 
allowing for different coefficients for public and private firms. We find that both models have higher 
predictive power for public firms than for private firms, especially within subsidiaries. While we do 
not explore the reasons for this difference in predictive power, this could be in part due to 
heterogeneity in the quality of accounting information provided by public and private firms (Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), for example, document that U.K. private firms exhibit lower timely loss 
recognition). 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
To obtain bankruptcy probability estimates, we start from the Estimation Sample of parents and 
subsidiaries with available financial statement information (see Table OA-2: Sample Selection and 
Descriptive Statistics). We limit this sample to observations for which ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ is available. 
This requirement leaves us with 594,890 parent-year and 1,309,173 subsidiary-year observations 
(Table OA-1, Panel B, Columns (4) and (5)).  
In order to examine the importance of group affiliation, we further limit the sample to groups 
with available ownership information to compute control rights. This leaves us with a final sample 
comprising 350,452 parent-year and 928,162 subsidiary-year observations over the period 2005-
2012.6 We refer to this sample as the Base Model Sample (Table OA-2, Panel A). 
Table OA-2, Panel B presents the distribution of parent and subsidiary firm-year observations by 
country. There are 117 countries represented in the sample: France, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Russia, 
                                                
6 In line with Shroff et al. (2014) and Beuselinck et al. (2018), we choose to keep in our sample countries with 
very few parent and/or subsidiary firm-year observations. This is to avoid a potential “domino effect” in the 
sample selection procedure induced by the dropping of less populated countries (for a detailed explanation of 
the issue, see Beuselinck et al. (2018), footnote 13). 
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U.K., and Japan account for most of the parents and subsidiaries (73% and 71%, respectively).7 Panel 
C (D) presents the sample distribution for the three types of firms by year (industry). Approximately 
40% of the parents are in the financial industry, which suggests that many business group parents are 
financial holding companies. These are followed by 16% in wholesale durable goods, and 11% in 
services. In contrast, only 16% of subsidiaries are in the financial industry. 24% of the subsidiaries are 
in wholesale durable goods and 14% in services. The industry distribution of standalone firms is 
similar to that of subsidiaries. Panel E presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the 
default prediction model. Parents are on average more profitable and have lower leverage than 
subsidiaries (they exhibit lower incidence of losses, ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧, higher ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and lower ܮܶܣ௜,௧ on 
average). Subsidiaries, despite having lower ܴܱܣ௜,௧ and higher leverage, ܮܶܣ௜,௧, have higher earnings 
before interest and tax, ܧܶܮ௜,௧. 
 
5. CDS Sample 
We obtain a sample of five-year credit default swap (CDS) contracts on senior unsecured debt 
issued by parents from Markit. We impose several data filters to ensure that we retain the most liquid 
CDS contract for each firm. In particular, for U.S. parents, we select U.S. Dollar denominated 
contracts with a no-restructuring clause for months following April 2009, and contracts with a 
modified restructuring clause for months before April 2009.8 For parents in the remaining sample 
countries, we select the CDS contract with highest depth. This results in 3,377 parent-year 
observations, 3,152 (3,077) of which with available distance to default (market) information. Using 
similar selection criteria for the sample of subsidiaries, we obtain 1,198 subsidiary-year observations, 
1,069 (509) of which have available distance to default (market) information. 
                                                
7 These cross-country differences in sample representation (which are consistent with other studies that use the 
Orbis database, such as Shroff et al. (2014) and Beuselinck et al. (2018)) may not only reflect differences in the 
number of firms in each country but also cross-country differences in reporting requirements. For example, in 
the U.S. only public firms are required to file their annual financial statements. To mitigate a potential concern 
that observations from the most represented parent and subsidiary countries in our sample may be driving our 
results, we conduct a battery of sensitivity tests (untabulated), where we remove parent- (subsidiary-) year 
observations from each of the parent (subsidiary) countries with higher sample representation both one-by-one 
and simultaneously. The tenor of our findings remains unchanged. 
8 A restructuring clause defines the credit events that trigger the settlement of a CDS contract. Under a modified 
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Figure OA-1: Default Prediction Model Validation - ROC Curves  
 
 








Figure OA-1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Standalone ROC curves 
 
This figure shows a set of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. Panels A, B and C present the ROC 
curves for the BCM (2012) model (equation (OA.1)), the Country/Industry/Time varying baseline model 
(equation (OA.2)), the macro model (equation (OA.3)) and the country and year fixed effects model (equation 
(OA.4)), for parents, subsidiaries and standalones, respectively. FPR and TPR stand for “False Positive Rate” 





Figure OA-2: Sensitivity and Specificity for Parent and Subsidiary Augmented Models 
 
Parent Augmented Model 
Sensitivity Specificity 
Sensitivity base model (blue): 0.66219 Specificity base model (blue): 0.68044 
Sensitivity augmented model (red): 0.67199 Specificity augmented model (red): 0.70753 
 
Parent Augment Model - Low Financial Reporting Quality 
Sensitivity Specificity 
Sensitivity base model (blue): 0.66255 Specificity base model (blue): 0.67957 
Sensitivity augmented model (red): 0.66667 Specificity augmented model (red): 0.69679 
 
Parent Augment Model - High Financial Reporting Quality 
Sensitivity Specificity 
Sensitivity base model (blue): 0.73684 Specificity base model (blue): 0.74508 
Sensitivity augmented model (red): 0.75439 Specificity augmented model (red): 0.74729 
 
Subsidiary Augmented Model 
Sensitivity Specificity 
Sensitivity base model (blue): 0.73684 Specificity base model (blue): 0.74508 
Sensitivity augmented model (red): 0.75439 Specificity augmented model (red): 0.74729 
 
This figure presents the sensitivity and specificity of the base (blue lines) and augmented (red lines) default prediction models for 
parents and subsidiaries at different probability thresholds. The parent base model as presented in Table 1, Panel A, Column (1) in 
the paper is estimated as follows: ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ሻ. The parent 
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augmented model adds the average estimated bankruptcy probability of all group subsidiaries (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത) to the parent base model 
(Table 1, Panel A, Column (2) in the paper). The subsidiary base model as presented in Table 3, Panel A, Column (1) in the paper 
is estimated as follows: ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ሻ. The subsidiary 
augmented model adds the estimated bankruptcy probability of the parent ((ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ) to the subsidiary base model (Table 3, 








This figure depicts the association between parent and subsidiary estimated bankruptcy probabilities. 
Each year, we sort subsidiaries into deciles based on their estimated bankruptcy probability 
(ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻ) and on their parents’ estimated bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ). These sorts are 
independent given that our sorting variables are correlated. We then plot the mean observed subsidiary 
bankruptcy rate in year ݐ ൅ 1 across the resulting 100 cells.   
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Figure OA-4: Example of Binary Recursive Partitioning for Parents 
 
 
This figure presents the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) for the parent augmented model that includes ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧, ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത, and തܻ௦,௧  (Table 6, Panel A, Column (2) in the paper). The tree is pruned for presentation purposes. 
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Figure OA-5: Example of Binary Recursive Partitioning for Subsidiaries 
 
 
This figure presents the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) for the subsidiary augmented model that includes ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧,	ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ, ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത, ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത, and ௣ܻ,௧ (Table 6, Panel C, Column (2) in the paper).The tree is pruned for presentation purposes. 
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Table OA-1: Default Prediction Model Validation 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Parents 
௜ܻ,௧ାଵ 0.0086 0.0921 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ 0.2554 0.4361 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧ 0.0468 0.1817 -0.0034 0.0267 0.0937 
ܮܶܣ௜,௧ 0.5478 0.3223 0.2929 0.5547 0.7802 
ܧܶܮ௜,௧  0.0456 0.7074 -0.0143 0.0520 0.1825 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ 8.5727 2.3704 6.8985 8.3305 9.9882 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧  0.5861 0.9667 0.1104 0.4249 0.7619 
ܨܩܦܲ ௜݃,௧ 0.0220 0.0169 0.0117 0.0200 0.0280 
ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧  0.0260 0.0242 0.0159 0.0190 0.0268 
Subsidiaries 
௜ܻ,௧ାଵ 0.0117 0.1074 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ 0.2720 0.4450 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧ 0.0378 0.1775 -0.0075 0.0250 0.0926 
ܮܶܣ௜,௧ 0.6798 0.3841 0.4360 0.6851 0.8821 
ܧܶܮ௜,௧  0.1441 0.4701 -0.0063 0.0614 0.2140 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ 8.4468 2.2784 6.8741 8.3305 9.9087 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧  0.6433 1.1398 0.1642 0.4249 0.8230 
ܨܩܦܲ ௜݃,௧ 0.0202 0.0160 0.0112 0.0182 0.0270 
ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧  0.0250 0.0971 0.0159 0.0190 0.0259 
Standalones 
௜ܻ,௧ାଵ 0.0051 0.0713 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧ 0.2728 0.4454 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧ 0.0541 0.2075 -0.0054 0.0194 0.0880 
ܮܶܣ௜,௧ 0.6491 0.3867 0.3662 0.6658 0.8923 
ܧܶܮ௜,௧  0.2618 0.8952 -0.0001 0.0628 0.2355 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ 6.4664 1.8788 5.2721 6.5972 7.7619 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ 0.6943 1.8002 0.1040 0.4108 0.7977 
ܨܩܦܲ ௜݃,௧ 0.0247 0.0220 0.0091 0.0200 0.0408 
ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧  0.0363 0.0311 0.0169 0.0217 0.0400 
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Table OA-1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Coefficients 
 Dependent variable: ௜ܻ,௧ାଵ 
 BCM (2012) Model  Country/Industry/Time varying baseline  Macro Model  Fixed Effects Model 
 Parents Subsidiaries Standalones  Parents Subsidiaries Standalones  Parents Subsidiaries Standalones  Parents Subsidiaries Standalones 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept -5.322*** -4.083*** -7.203***  -5.507*** -3.990*** -7.794***  -5.358*** -3.973*** -7.456***  -5.451*** -4.009*** -7.209*** 
 (-21.33) (-7.68) (-9.08)  (-19.42) (-7.88) (-9.35)  (-18.79) (-10.76) (-14.80)  (-21.62) (-8.43) (-7.68) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௜,௧  0.446*** 0.266*** 0.047  0.459*** 0.279*** 0.054  0.397*** 0.277*** 0.034  0.461*** 0.258*** 0.110 
 (3.72) (4.09) (0.18)  (4.03) (5.13) (0.17)  (3.88) (7.44) (0.11)  (3.98) (3.41) (0.49) 
ܴܱܣ௜,௧  -0.845*** -0.787*** -1.275***  -0.943*** -0.837*** -1.522***  -1.016*** -0.838*** -1.550***  -0.996*** -0.818*** -1.274** 
 (-3.02) (-7.46) (-2.66)  (-3.26) (-7.21) (-3.08)  (-3.84) (-7.07) (-2.91)  (-3.43) (-10.56) (-2.56) 
ܮܶܣ௜,௧  1.390*** 0.393*** 1.059***  1.455*** 0.396*** 1.178***  1.409*** 0.394*** 1.188***  1.355*** 0.388*** 1.042** 
 (11.25) (4.48) (2.64)  (10.86) (4.60) (2.66)  (10.65) (4.66) (2.62)  (10.78) (4.26) (2.34) 
ܧܶܮ௜,௧  0.009 -0.241*** 0.018  0.028 -0.211*** 0.050  0.021 -0.210*** 0.082  -0.041 -0.235*** 0.043 
 (0.11) (-3.82) (0.12)  (0.34) (-4.25) (0.26)  (0.27) (-5.07) (0.54)  (-0.48) (-3.73) (0.30) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௜,௧ሻ  -0.056** -0.088*** 0.171**  -0.050* -0.111*** 0.221***  -0.041 -0.111*** 0.209***  -0.054** -0.087*** 0.142* 
 (-2.16) (-2.65) (2.36)  (-1.75) (-4.42) (2.89)  (-1.40) (-4.63) (3.22)  (-2.02) (-3.04) (1.93) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௜,௧      0.088 0.067 0.025  0.080 0.066 0.016     
     (0.83) (1.23) (1.46)  (0.73) (1.20) (1.31)     
ܨܩܦܲ݃௜,௧          -23.653*** -0.920 -5.779     
         (-2.58) (-0.11) (-0.55)     
ܨܫܰܨ௜,௧          10.122*** 0.042 -4.616     
         (2.91) (0.42) (-0.44)     
Country FE No No No  No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No  No No No  No No No  Yes Yes Yes 




Table OA-1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Predictive Power 
    Parents (N=527,063) Subsidiaries (N=1,165,149) Standalones (N=499,171) 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
BCM (2012) Model 
0 29.80 16.47 9.51 23.12 15.01 9.52 28.06 25.77 9.66 
1 17.12 16.20 9.64 15.35 13.80 9.70 14.03 16.26 9.88 
2 12.61 13.71 9.80 10.93 11.58 9.89 11.48 13.35 9.94 
Total 59.53 46.38 28.95 49.40 40.39 29.11 53.57 55.38 29.48 
AUC 0.7055     0.6485     0.6309     
Country/Industry/Time varying baseline 
0 30.36 17.02 9.48 23.44 16.03 9.45 27.66 27.44 9.64 
1 17.45 15.72 9.66 15.38 13.89 9.69 14.23 16.59 9.88 
2 11.84 13.55 9.82 11.25 12.66 9.82 11.08 12.03 9.96 
Total 59.65 46.29 28.96 50.07 42.58 28.96 52.97 56.06 29.47 
AUC 0.7330     0.7185     0.6487     
Macro Model 
0 32.81 19.00 9.36 22.67 16.47 9.43 27.38 28.25 9.62 
1 17.49 17.07 9.60 14.65 14.30 9.68 14.47 17.32 9.86 
2 12.42 13.45 9.82 11.02 12.13 9.86 9.92 12.49 9.96 
Total 62.72 49.52 28.78 48.34 42.91 28.97 51.77 58.06 29.45 
AUC 0.7355     0.6998     0.6310     
Fixed Effects Model  
0 31.93 18.48 9.39 22.38 14.92 9.53 27.54 23.46 9.70 
1 16.77 17.25 9.60 14.82 13.39 9.73 12.40 15.09 9.91 
2 12.50 14.29 9.78 12.00 11.62 9.87 9.96 11.44 9.98 
Total 61.19 50.03 28.77 49.20 39.92 29.14 49.90 49.99 29.58 
AUC 0.7193     0.6330     0.6054     
 
Panel D: Significance of AUC differences 
 p-values 
  Parents Subsidiaries Standalones 
BCM (2012) Model vs. Country/Industry/Time varying baseline 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Macro Model vs. Country/Industry/Time varying baseline 0.2871 0.0000 0.0000 
Fixed Effects Model vs. Country/Industry/Time varying baseline 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table OA-1 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Predictive Power Public vs. Private 
Parents Subsidiaries 
Private Public Private Public 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Country/Industry/Time  varying baseline 
Pooled estimation 
0 29.31 16.27 9.47 32.23 18.25 9.50 23.46 15.98 9.45 26.63 17.08 9.48 
1 16.1 14.99 9.68 18.97 17.94 9.61 15.51 13.52 9.71 15.00 15.37 9.68 
2 12.36 12.89 9.83 11.31 14.56 9.81 11.12 12.47 9.83 11.50 12.88 9.84 
Total 57.77 44.15 28.98 62.51 50.75 28.92 50.09 41.97 28.99 53.13 45.33 29.00 
AUC 0.7193 0.7496 0.7142 0.7511 
Country/Industry/Time  varying baseline 
Public vs. Private partition-specific 
coefficients 
0 30.46 16.21 9.46 33.40 21.54 9.36 23.09 15.43 9.49 27.52 18.33 9.40 
1 15.86 14.89 9.69 17.48 16.19 9.70 15.33 13.66 9.70 14.05 14.47 9.74 
2 11.55 12.55 9.85 12.35 14.75 9.79 11.12 12.03 9.86 11.34 12.2 9.88 
Total 57.87 43.65 29.00 63.23 52.48 28.85 49.54 41.12 29.05 52.91 45.00 29.02 
AUC 0.7188 0.7541 0.7126 0.7460 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the default prediction models estimated using the Estimation Sample (see Table OA-2, Panel A). Panel B 
reports coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of four different discrete hazard models. The dependent variable is equal to one if firm ݅ (parent, 
subsidiary, or standalone) files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the country and year level. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel C presents a comparison between the predictive ability of the four models 
estimated out-of-sample. Column (1) reports the percentage of bankrupt firm-years that fall in each of the top three deciles of the predicted bankruptcy probability, Column (2) 
reports the percentage of years before bankruptcy, and Column (3) reports the percentage of non-bankrupt years. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Curve (AUC) is also 
reported. Panel D reports the p-values for the comparison of the AUC of the different models. Panel E compares the predictive ability of the Country/Industry/Time varying 
baseline model for public and private firms. We first estimate a single set of coefficients based on the pooled Estimation Sample and then estimate separate sets of coefficients for 





Table OA-2: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Criteria 
Estimation Sample  
This sample comprises parents (ultimate owners), subsidiaries (levels 1 to 5) and standalone firms with 
total assets and sales greater than U.S. $10,000, excluding Other legal form entities, Museums and 
educational services, Private households, Membership organizations (SIC codes 8000-8999) and Public 
services (SIC code 9000-9999). This sample includes three types of observations: non-bankrupt firms, 
years before bankruptcy for bankrupt firms and bankruptcy year. 
 
 Unique Obs. Firm-Year Obs. 
- Parents 105,999 640,627 
- Subsidiaries 237,319 1,412,890 
- Standalones 117,764 614,178 
Base Model Sample 
This sample limits the Estimation Sample to the subset of business group firms (parents and subsidiaries) 
for which ownership information to compute control rights is available. In the Base Model Sample of 
subsidiary firm-years, only the parent with the highest percentage of control in each subsidiary is 
retained. 
 
  Firm-Year Obs. 
- Parents 350,452 
- Subsidiaries 928,162 
Placebo Test Sample 
This sample limits the Base-Model Sample to the subset of parents and subsidiaries for which a 
successful match with pseudo-parents and pseudo-subsidiaries obtains. Pseudo-parents and pseudo-
subsidiaries are, respectively, median-sized standalone firms from the same country-industry of parents 
and subsidiaries. 
 
  Firm-Year Obs. 
- Parents (and matched pseudo-parents) 255,102 
- Subsidiaries (and matched pseudo-subsidiaries) 510,581 
- All standalones used in the placebo tests 544,704 
Combined Model Sample 
This sample limits the Base Model Sample to the subset of publicly-listed parents and subsidiaries with 
available data to compute market variables. 
 
  Firm-Year Obs. 
- Parents 31,051 
- Subsidiaries 23,422 
CDS Sample 
This sample limits the Base Model Sample to the subset of parents and subsidiaries with available 5-year 
CDS contract data. 
 
  Firm-Year Obs. 
- Parents 3,377 




Table OA-2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Sample Composition by Country 
Country Parents  Subsidiaries  Standalones Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
Algeria 0 0.00  21 0.00  0 0.00 
Argentina 58 0.02  505 0.05  0 0.00 
Australia 787 0.22  977 0.11  255 0.05 
Austria 384 0.11  2,138 0.23  578 0.11 
Bahamas 8 0.00  0 0.00  0 0.00 
Bahrain 11 0.00  17 0.00  0 0.00 
Bangladesh 3 0.00  10 0.00  0 0.00 
Barbados 5 0.00  16 0.00  0 0.00 
Belgium 7,835 2.24  27,911 3.01  1,245 0.23 
Bermuda 151 0.04  189 0.02  0 0.00 
Bolivia 0 0.00  7 0.00  0 0.00 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 251 0.07  1,113 0.12  9,414 1.73 
Botswana 6 0.00  13 0.00  0 0.00 
Brazil 375 0.11  1,462 0.16  37 0.01 
Bulgaria 1,259 0.36  3,654 0.39  2,883 0.53 
Burkina Faso 0 0.00  1 0.00  0 0.00 
Canada 785 0.22  934 0.10  1,046 0.19 
Cayman Islands 69 0.02  178 0.02  7 0.00 
Chile 67 0.02  156 0.02  0 0.00 
China 1,366 0.39  2,503 0.27  2,183 0.40 
Colombia 902 0.26  2,217 0.24  5,393 0.99 
Costa Rica 0 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 0.00  24 0.00  0 0.00 
Croatia 1,346 0.38  3,656 0.39  618 0.11 
Curaçao 12 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Cyprus 96 0.03  140 0.02  36 0.01 
Czech Republic 5,454 1.56  14,368 1.55  10,930 2.01 
Denmark 3,820 1.09  7,600 0.82  213 0.04 
Dominica 0 0.00  5 0.00  0 0.00 
Ecuador 10 0.00  17 0.00  8 0.00 
Egypt 43 0.01  102 0.01  18 0.00 
El Salvador 0 0.00  9 0.00  0 0.00 
Estonia 1,228 0.35  5,020 0.54  2,237 0.41 
Fiji 6 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Finland 10,996 3.14  25,143 2.71  1,347 0.25 
France 89,242 25.46  208,946 22.51  40,810 7.49 
Gabon 0 0.00  7 0.00  0 0.00 
Germany 3,558 1.02  17,313 1.87  5,106 0.94 
Ghana 0 0.00  14 0.00  0 0.00 
Gibraltar 10 0.00   0 0.00 
Greece 1,305 0.37  4,552 0.49  3,165 0.58 
Guatemala 2 0.00  5 0.00  0 0.00 
Guyana 0 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Hong Kong 53 0.02  82 0.01  0 0.00 
Hungary 132 0.04  304 0.03  95 0.02 
Iceland 585 0.17  1,130 0.12  1,422 0.26 
India 1,999 0.57  7,242 0.78  3,983 0.73 
Indonesia 52 0.01  183 0.02  0 0.00 
Iran 0 0.00  1 0.00  0 0.00 




Table OA-2 (continued) 
 
(continued) 
Country Parents  Subsidiaries  Standalones Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
Israel 259 0.07  241 0.03  36 0.01 
Italy 21,580 6.16  78,920 8.50  130,649 23.99 
Jamaica 18 0.01  17 0.00  0 0.00 
Japan 11,980 3.42  47,637 5.13  1,029 0.19 
Jordan 124 0.04  311 0.03  30 0.01 
Kazakhstan 9 0.00  31 0.00  9 0.00 
Kenya 9 0.00  39 0.00  0 0.00 
Korea 1,798 0.51  5,885 0.63  19,238 3.53 
Kuwait 142 0.04  242 0.03  10 0.00 
Latvia 355 0.10  737 0.08  477 0.09 
Liberia 4 0.00  7 0.00  0 0.00 
Lithuania 240 0.07  1,282 0.14  598 0.11 
Luxembourg 607 0.17  1,574 0.17  222 0.04 
Macedonia 12 0.00  17 0.00  0 0.00 
Malaysia 302 0.09  425 0.05  3,966 0.73 
Malta 151 0.04  397 0.04  20 0.00 
Marshall Islands 12 0.00  3 0.00  0 0.00 
Mauritius 22 0.01  28 0.00  2 0.00 
Mexico 220 0.06  923 0.10  0 0.00 
Moldova 26 0.01  50 0.01  23 0.00 
Monaco 0 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Montenegro 7 0.00  34 0.00  0 0.00 
Morocco 1 0.00  32 0.00  3 0.00 
Namibia 0 0.00  2 0.00  0 0.00 
Nepal 0 0.00  8 0.00  0 0.00 
Netherlands 6,626 1.89  12,414 1.34  238 0.04 
New Zealand 20 0.01  362 0.04  7 0.00 
Nigeria 12 0.00  88 0.01  0 0.00 
Norway 5,457 1.56  29,760 3.21  16,903 3.10 
Oman 42 0.01  84 0.01  0 0.00 
Pakistan 66 0.02  172 0.02  152 0.03 
Palestine 12 0.00  60 0.01  0 0.00 
Panama 5 0.00  6 0.00  0 0.00 
Paraguay 0 0.00  4 0.00  0 0.00 
Peru 21 0.01  71 0.01  0 0.00 
Philippines 19 0.01  102 0.01  0 0.00 
Poland 3,526 1.01  15,784 1.70  6,991 1.28 
Portugal 10,131 2.89  30,152 3.25  43,787 8.04 
Qatar 6 0.00  13 0.00  0 0.00 
Romania 1,101 0.31  6,341 0.68  9,797 1.80 
Russia 12,300 3.51  30,456 3.28  96,136 17.65 
Saudi Arabia 68 0.02  72 0.01  1 0.00 
Serbia 471 0.13  3,018 0.33  2,323 0.43 
Singapore 202 0.06  287 0.03  7 0.00 
Slovakia 827 0.24  2,911 0.31  2,295 0.42 
Slovenia 603 0.17  2,680 0.29  2,418 0.44 
South Africa 139 0.04  122 0.01  0 0.00 
Spain 48,606 13.87  124,552 13.42  61,073 11.21 
Sri Lanka 90 0.03  261 0.03  0 0.00 




Table OA-2 (continued) 
 
(continued) 
Country Parents  Subsidiaries  Standalones Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
Switzerland 634 0.18  527 0.06  74 0.01 
Taiwan 2,338 0.67  3,379 0.36  151 0.03 
Tanzania 0 0.00  7 0.00  0 0.00 
Thailand 144 0.04  359 0.04  2,130 0.39 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 0.00  12 0.00  0 0.00 
Tunisia 0 0.00  14 0.00  0 0.00 
Turkey 196 0.06  700 0.08  237 0.04 
Ukraine 8,483 2.42  15,146 1.63  8,358 1.53 
United Arab Emirates 19 0.01  10 0.00  0 0.00 
United Kingdom 13,081 3.73  55,422 5.97  38,279 7.03 
United States 4,748 1.35  865 0.09  795 0.15 
Uruguay 0 0.00  2 0.00  0 0.00 
Venezuela 11 0.00  19 0.00  0 0.00 
Vietnam 53 0.02  114 0.01  64 0.01 
Virgin Islands 23 0.01  24 0.00  0 0.00 
Zambia 0 0.00  7 0.00  0 0.00 
Zimbabwe 0 0.00  5 0.00  0 0.00 
Total 350,452 100.00  928,162 100.00  544,704 100.00 
 
 
Panel C: Firm-Year Observations by Year 
Year Parents  Subsidiaries  Standalones Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
2006 34,369 9.81  88,812 9.57  59,739 10.97 
2007 39,941 11.40  104,156 11.22  69,859 12.82 
2008 45,176 12.89  118,558 12.77  74,771 13.73 
2009 50,265 14.34  133,848 14.42  82,105 15.07 
2010 57,040 16.28  151,614 16.33  84,731 15.56 
2011 60,467 17.25  161,420 17.39  85,213 15.64 
2012 63,194 18.03  169,754 18.29  88,293 16.21 
Total 350,452 100.00  928,162 100.00  544,711 100.00 
 
 
Panel D: Firm-Year Observations by Industry 
One-Digit SIC Code Parents  Subsidiaries  Standalones Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
0: Agriculture, forestry and fishery 6,897 1.97  18,679 2.01  21,382 3.93 
1: Mining and construction 32,315 9.22  113,172 12.19  78,551 14.42 
2: Light manufactured products 22,745 6.49  81,063 8.73  48,151 8.84 
3: Heavy manufactured products 31,453 8.97  115,724 12.47  60,257 11.06 
4: Transportation, communications, 
electric, gas and sanitary services 18,779 5.36  91,950 9.91  32,346 5.94 
5: Wholesale and retail trade 55,107 15.72  224,341 24.17  140,756 25.84 
6: Finance, insurance and real estate 144,378 41.20  151,693 16.34  94,742 17.39 
7: Services 38,778 11.07  131,540 14.17  68,526 12.58 




Table OA-2 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Main Models 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Parent-level variables: 
௣ܻ,௧ାଵ  350,452 0.0085 0.0920 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  350,452 0.2359 0.4245 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  350,452 0.0569 0.1452 0.0000 0.0281 0.0925 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  350,452 0.5272 0.3076 0.2783 0.5382 0.7610 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  350,452 0.0962 0.4863 -0.0096 0.0493 0.1685 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  350,452 8.6888 2.3676 7.0139 8.3974 10.0180 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  350,452 0.6208 0.9153 0.1831 0.5005 0.8163 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  310,181 0.0051 0.0034 0.0028 0.0045 0.0064 തܻ௦,௧   302,462 0.0162 0.1262 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܦ2ܦ௣,௧  29,342 3.9704 2.4709 2.1811 3.5769 5.2768 
ܸܱܮ௣,௧  31,773 0.4397 0.2248 0.2902 0.3910 0.5344 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧  31,365 -8.7569 2.2121 -10.3367 -8.9025 -7.2893 
ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧  31,774 -0.1450 0.4046 -0.3927 -0.1594 0.0560 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  287,274 0.0030 0.0019 0.0016 0.0029 0.0041 തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧  278,919 0.0109 0.1038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Subsidiary-level variables: 
௦ܻ,௧ାଵ  928,162 0.0115 0.1066 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  928,162 0.2807 0.4494 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  928,162 0.0323 0.1698 -0.0091 0.0216 0.0841 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  928,162 0.6827 0.3868 0.4414 0.6888 0.8841 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  928,162 0.1271 0.4588 -0.0083 0.0559 0.1972 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  928,162 8.2471 2.1952 6.7499 8.1411 9.6525 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧  928,162 0.6433 1.0310 0.1791 0.4648 0.8597 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  823,764 0.0030 0.0026 0.0013 0.0024 0.0039 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത 650,943 0.0046 0.0027 0.0025 0.0044 0.0060 
௣ܻ,௧  855,821 0.0039 0.0622 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത  660,058 0.0059 0.0448 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ܦ2ܦ௣,௧  23,422 3.6421 2.3208 1.9693 3.2660 4.8975 
ܸܱܮ௣,௧  25,773 0.4887 0.2800 0.3096 0.4240 0.5827 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧  15,653 -7.7777 2.4532 -9.6165 -7.9934 -6.1811 
ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧  25,754 -0.1138 0.4407 -0.3908 -0.1597 0.0776 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ  673,764 0.0032 0.0020 0.0018 0.0030 0.0042 തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧  694,606 0.0063 0.0790 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
This table presents sample selection criteria, sample composition and descriptive statistics for the sample of 
parent, subsidiary and standalone firm-year observations. Panel A presents the sample selection criteria. We 
build five different samples: (1) the Estimation Sample of parent, subsidiary and standalone firm-year 
observations; (2) the Base Model Sample; (3) the Placebo Test Sample; (4) the Combined Model Sample; and (5) 
the CDS Sample. Panels B, C and D respectively present the distribution of observations by country, year and 
industry for the Base Model Sample containing the subset of observations from the Estimation Sample (Table 
OA-1) for which ownership information to compute control rights is available. Panel E presents descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the main default prediction models. All variables are defined in the paper 




Table OA-3: Placebo Test - Parent Model 
 
  Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ  
Independent variables:  (1) (2) 
Intercept  -5.642*** -5.647*** 
 (-12.74) (-12.74) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  (+) 0.288*** 0.288*** 
 (2.78) (2.78) 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  (–) -2.563*** -2.564*** 
 (-8.99) (-9.03) 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  (+) 1.690*** 1.689*** 
 (9.12) (9.12) 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  (–) -0.193 -0.193 
 (-1.41) (-1.41) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  (–) -0.067** -0.067** 
 (-2.04) (-2.04) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  (+) 0.154* 0.156* 
 (1.79) (1.83) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (NS) 104.566 104.734 
 (1.48) (1.49) 
തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧  (NS) -0.214 
 (-0.55) 
Comp. Model  
Model (1) 
without 




ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  
and 
തܻ௦௧ௗ௟௡,௧  
AUC  0.7404 0.7404 
AUC (Comp. Model)  0.7511 0.7511 
p-value (vs. Comp. Model)  0.0000 0.0000 
% Top Three Deciles  64.17 63.91 
% Top Three Deciles (Comp. Model)  64.64 64.64 
Obs.  255,102 255,102 
This table reports the results of a placebo test in which each subsidiary is replaced by the median-sized 
standalone firm in the same country-industry. The sample is limited to observations for which a successful 
match with standalone firms from the same country-industry obtains (Placebo Test Sample). All variables are 
defined in the paper Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent-country and 
year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. The subscripts ݌ and ݏtdln are used to identify parent- and standalone-level variables, respectively. 
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Table OA-4: Augmented Parent Combined Model 
 
Panel A: Parent Hazard Model 
  Dependent variable: ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ  
Independent variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -4.519*** -5.889*** -8.282*** -9.652*** 
(-4.80) (-4.77) (-4.22) (-4.59) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  (+) -0.535 -0.559 -0.403 -0.372 
(-1.15) (-1.17) (-0.65) (-0.59) 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  (–) -9.213*** -8.513*** -8.461*** -6.972*** 
(-4.90) (-4.57) (-4.70) (-3.60) 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  (+) 1.160* 1.215* 2.006*** 2.069*** 
(1.70) (1.96) (4.51) (4.71) 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  (–) 0.871** 1.076** 0.902** 0.907** 
(2.12) (2.02) (2.39) (2.13) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  (–) -0.075 -0.010 -0.002 0.068 
(-0.77) (-0.09) (-0.01) (0.49) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  0.083*** 0.090*** 0.100** 0.139*** 
 (3.20) (4.49) (2.42) (3.06) 
ܦ2ܦ௣,௧ (–) -0.474*** -0.451***   
 (-2.99) (-3.06)   
ܸܱܮ௣,௧    1.556*** 1.519*** 
   (3.59) (4.19) 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧    0.006 -0.001 
   (0.08) (-0.01) 
ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧  (+)  -0.852* -0.954* 
 (-1.73) (-1.75) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)  106.950***   96.918*** 
 (5.23)   (3.98) 
Marginal effects:     
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത   0.108  0.1386 




Table OA-4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Predictive Ability 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3) 
Model (1) 
0 70.15 39.59 9.47 
1 5.97 16.38 9.93 
2 2.99 8.19 10.04 
Total 79.10 64.16 29.45 
AUC 0.8377   
Model (2) 
0 70.15 37.20 9.50 
1 7.46 15.70 9.94 
2 4.48 11.26 10.00 
Total 82.09 64.16 29.44 
AUC 0.8552   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0783   
 0 63.77 39.63 9.47 
 1 11.59 12.38 9.97 
Model (3) 2 7.25 9.91 10.01 
 Total 82.61 61.92 29.45 
 AUC 0.8483   
 0 75.36 36.84 9.48 
 1 2.90 11.15 10.01 
Model (4) 2 5.80 9.60 10.02 
 Total 84.06 57.59 29.50 
 AUC  0.8761   
 p-value (vs. Model (3)) 0.0215   
This table presents the results of the parent default prediction analysis for the Combined Model Sample (see 
Table OA-2, Panel A) of publicly listed parent firms using a model that combines accounting and market data. 
The number of observations decreases with respect to the specification presented in Table 1, Panel A in the 
paper, due to data availability requirements on distance to default and remaining market variables. Panel A 
reports coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of a discrete hazard model. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the parent files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. The 
specification presented in Column (1) includes parent-level financial ratios and parent-level distance to default 
only: ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ ݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧, ܴܱܣ௣,௧, ܮܶܣ௣,௧, ܧܶܮ௣,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ, ܦ2ܦ௣,௧, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧ሻ. Column (2) 
adds the average estimated bankruptcy probability of all group subsidiaries (Pr	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതത). In Column (3) the 
distance to default measure (ܦ2ܦ௣,௧) is replaced by the volatility of the parent’s returns (ܸܱܮ௣,௧), the parent’s 
market capitalization relative to its country total market capitalization (ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧), and the parent’s returns over 
the previous year (ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧). Column (4) adds the average estimated bankruptcy probability of all group 
subsidiaries (ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത) to the specification presented in Column (3). Marginal effects for group-level variables 
are reported as the change in estimated bankruptcy probability as each of the group-level variables increases by 
one standard deviation, scaled by the average estimated bankruptcy probability. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are clustered at the parent-country and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Panel B presents a comparison between the predictive 
power of the augmented models and that of the base models reported in Columns (1) and (3) using constant 
samples. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the percentage of bankrupt years, years before bankruptcy and non-
bankrupt firm-years falling in each of the top three deciles. The Area Under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve (AUC) is also reported for each subgroup. All variables are defined in the paper Appendix. 








Panel A: Augmented Parent Model by Parent-Country Capital Market Development and Financial 
Reporting Transparency 
  Parent-Country Capital Market Development 
  Weak  Strong 
  Financial Reporting Transparency  Financial Reporting Transparency 
 Low  High  Low  High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 
ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯














AUC 0.7337 0.7856 0.6741 0.8373 
AUC (Comp. Model) 0.7158 0.7821 0.6631 0.8407 
p-value (vs. Comp. Model) 0.0000 0.1469 0.0109 0.1069 
% Top Three Deciles 66.43 80.00 52.00 81.88 




Panel B: Augmented Parent Model by Parent-Country Rule of Law and Financial Reporting Transparency 
  Parent-Country Rule of Law 
  Weak  Strong 
  Financial Reporting Transparency  Financial Reporting Transparency 
 Low  High  Low  High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 
ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯







ܲݎሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  
Model (7) 
without 




AUC 0.6422  0.7818  0.7392  0.8126 
AUC (Comp. Model) 0.6206  0.7809  0.7319  0.8132 
p-value (vs. Comp. Model) 0.0159  0.6929  0.0000  0.1586 
% Top Three Deciles 80.00 66.43 81.88 52.00 
% Top Three Deciles (Comp. Model) 78.57 61.54 79.55 52.00 
This table presents the results of an additional analysis based on the tests shown in Table 2 of the paper. Specifically, 
Panels A and B present sample partitions based on capital market development (computed as ratio of total market 
capitalization of all firms in a country to the country’s GDP. Source: World Bank) and rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 
2009), respectively. In this analysis, the Base Model Sample (see Table OA-2, Panel A) is limited to parents for which 
consolidated financial statements are available and to subsidiaries that are consolidated, i.e., in which the parent’s 
control rights are equal to, or higher than, 50%. We classify a country as having high (low) financial reporting 
transparency if it falls in the Leuz (2010) institutional clusters 1 or 2 (3, 4, or 5). A parent country is classified as having 
strong (weak) capital market development and rule of law if the country’s capital market development and rule of law 
indices are above (below) the respective sample medians. The dependent variable is equal to one if the parent files for 
bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) and 
the percentage of bankrupt years in the top three deciles are reported for each sample partition, as is the p-value for the 
increase in the AUC in the augmented model. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent-
country and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. All variables are defined in the paper Appendix. The subscripts ݌ and ݏ are used to identify parent- and 
subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
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Table OA-6: Placebo Test - Subsidiary Model 
 
  Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
Independent variables: (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  -4.124*** -5.039*** -4.129*** -5.040*** 
 (-6.78) (-8.75) (-6.93) (-8.85) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.322*** 0.256*** 0.318*** 0.254*** 
 (6.93) (4.32) (6.72) (4.23) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -0.785*** -0.716*** -0.807*** -0.733*** 
 (-4.52) (-3.74) (-5.23) (-4.10) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 0.440*** 0.320*** 0.448*** 0.323*** 
 (4.63) (3.15) (4.95) (3.37) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) -0.206*** -0.172*** -0.197*** -0.162*** 
 (-5.13) (-4.25) (-4.70) (-3.80) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) -0.133*** -0.087** -0.132*** -0.088** 
 (-3.38) (-2.30) (-3.47) (-2.37) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ (+) 0.126** 0.120** 0.116* 0.109* 
 (1.98) (2.05) (1.76) (1.82) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ  (NS) 80.708 25.969 79.915 26.686 
 (1.48) (0.73) (1.49) (0.78) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+) 151.786*** 152.722*** 
 (7.18) (7.02) 
௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧തതതതതതതതതത  (+) 1.686*** 2.408*** 
 (15.45) (8.94) 
Comp.  Model  
Model (2)  
without 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ 





ܲݎሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ  
Model (5) 
without 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ௧ௗ௟௡,௧ାଵሻ  
AUC  0.6989 0.7064 0.7007 0.7082 
AUC (Comp.  Model) 0.7152 0.7162 0.7170 0.7181 
p-value  (vs. Comp. Model) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
% Top Three Deciles 50.55 51.96 50.88 52.13 
% Top Three Deciles (Comp.  Model) 51.15 52.99 51.75 53.07 
Obs.  510,581 510,581 484,321 481,807 
This table reports the results of a placebo test in which each parent is replaced by the median-sized standalone firm in 
the same country-industry. The sample is limited to observations for which a successful match with standalone firms 
from the same country-industry obtains (Placebo Test Sample). All variables are defined in the paper Appendix. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary-country and year level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The subscripts ݏ and ݏtdln are used to 
identify subsidiary- and standalone-level variables, respectively. 
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Table OA-7: Augmented Subsidiary Combined Model  
 
Panel A: Subsidiary Hazard Model 
  Dependent variable: ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  -6.345*** -8.446*** -8.692*** -7.125 -7.877 -10.100** 
 (-6.59) (-9.08) (-9.80) (-1.64) (-1.53) (-2.12) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.022 -0.056 -0.085 -0.065 -0.206 -0.196 
 (0.18) (-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.23) (-0.75) (-0.66) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -3.923*** -3.947*** -3.518*** -3.545*** -3.567*** -3.285*** 
 (-5.15) (-5.71) (-4.20) (-5.74) (-4.45) (-3.52) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 0.480 0.543* 0.775** 0.653** 0.538* 0.749 
 (1.53) (1.79) (2.14) (2.40) (1.88) (1.51) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) 0.091 0.053 0.040 0.155 0.115 0.268 
 (0.21) (0.10) (0.06) (0.71) (0.43) (0.88) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) 0.118 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.060 0.098 0.175 
 (1.54) (2.71) (2.88) (0.22) (0.31) (0.62) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧ (+) 0.036** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.047 0.077 0.086* 
 (2.27) (3.27) (2.90) (1.37) (1.33) (1.66) 
ܦ2ܦ௦,௧   -0.412*** -0.320*** -0.333***    
  (-4.02) (-3.28) (-2.60)    
ܸܱܮ௦,௧      0.613 0.272 -0.220 
     (1.26) (0.41) (-0.24) 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௦,௧      0.025 0.019 -0.089 
     (0.17) (0.12) (-0.73) 
ܴܧ ௦ܶ,௧      -0.556** -0.551* -0.565* 
     (-2.20) (-1.96) (-1.95) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  (+)  234.288*** 155.592***  220.323*** 119.168** 
  (45.05) (8.41)  (5.71) (2.55) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)   97.710**   183.728*** 
   (2.20)   (2.97) 
Marginal Effects:        
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ    0.209 0.138  0.290 0.143 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത     0.107   0.282 
Obs.  23,422 20,815 18,250 15,429 13,059 11,101 
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Table OA-7 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Predictive Ability 
Model Decile (1) (2) (3) 
Model (1) 
0 43.84 33.92 9.45 
1 16.44 16.25 9.88 
2 4.11 9.19 10.04 
Total 64.38 59.36 29.37 
AUC 0.7523   
Model (2) 
0 41.10 40.28 9.35 
1 15.07 11.66 9.96 
2 12.33 9.19 10.01 
Total 68.49 61.13 29.32 
AUC 0.7894   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0110   
 0 41.10 38.87 9.38 
 1 15.07 13.07 9.93 
Model (3) 2 12.33 8.13 10.03 
 Total 68.49 60.07 29.34 
 AUC 0.7965   
 p-value (vs. Model (1)) 0.0016   
 0 35.90 28.71 9.71 
 1 10.26 11.88 9.98 
Model (4) 2 5.13 7.92 10.05 
 Total 51.28 48.51 29.73 
 AUC  0.6609   
 0 30.77 27.72 9.74 
 1 5.13 14.85 9.97 
Model (5) 2 23.08 9.90 9.97 
 Total 58.97 52.48 29.67 
 AUC 0.7606   
 p-value (vs. Model (4)) 0.0060   
 0 33.33 30.69 9.70 
 1 15.38 15.84 9.92 
Model (6) 2 2.56 6.93 10.07 
 Total 51.28 53.47 29.69 
 AUC 0.7859   
 p-value (vs. Model (4)) 0.0012   
This table presents the results of the subsidiary default prediction analysis for the Combined Model Sample (see 
Table OA-2, Panel A) of publicly listed subsidiary firms using a model that combines accounting and market 
data. The number of observations decreases with respect to the specification presented in Table 5, Panel A, due 
to data availability requirements on distance to default and remaining market variables. Panel A reports 
coefficients and (in parentheses) z-statistics from the estimation of a discrete hazard model. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if the subsidiary files for bankruptcy in year ݐ ൅ 1, and zero otherwise. The specification 
presented in Column (1) includes subsidiary-level financial ratios and distance to default only: ܲݎ൫ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ ൌ
݂ሺܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧, ܴܱܣ௦,௧, ܮܶܣ௦,௧, ܧܶܮ௦,௧, ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ, ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧, ܦ2ܦ௦,௧ሻ, Column (2) adds the parent estimated 
bankruptcy probability (Pr൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯ሻ and Column (3) the average estimated bankruptcy probability of other 
subsidiaries in the group ((ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത). In Column (4) the distance to default measure (ܦ2ܦ௦,௧) is replaced 
by the volatility of the subsidiary’s returns (ܸܱܮ௦,௧), the subsidiary’s market capitalization relative to its 
country’s total market capitalization (ܴܵܫܼܧ௦,௧), and the subsidiary’s returns over the previous year (ܴܧ ௦ܶ,௧ሻ. 
Columns (5) and (6) add the parent estimated bankruptcy probability (ܲݎ൫ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵ ൌ 1൯) and the average 
bankruptcy probability of other subsidiaries in the group (ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത) to the specification presented in 
Column (4). Marginal effects for group-level variables are reported as the change in estimated bankruptcy 
probability as each of the group-level variables increases by one standard deviation, scaled by the average 
estimated bankruptcy probability. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent-country 
and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. Panel B presents a comparison between the predictive power of the augmented models and that of 
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the base models reported in Columns (1) and (4) using constant samples. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the 
percentage of bankrupt years, years before bankruptcy and non-bankrupt firm-years falling in each of the top 
three deciles. The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) is also reported for each 
subgroup. All variables are defined in the paper Appendix. The subscripts ݌, and ݏ are used to identify parent- 
and subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
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Table OA-8: Cross-Sectional Variation in CDS Spreads  
 
Panel A: Parent CDS Spreads 
  Dependent variable: ܮܰ൫ܥܦܵ5 ௣ܻ,௧൯  
Independent variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -3.584*** -4.095*** -3.473*** -3.954*** -5.381*** -5.686*** 
(-4.81) (-6.52) (-4.36) (-5.75) (-5.30) (-6.44) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௣,௧  (+) 0.643*** 0.666*** 0.511** 0.539*** 0.282 0.285 
 (2.90) (3.02) (2.58) (2.73) (1.38) (1.33) 
ܴܱܣ௣,௧  (–) -2.934 -2.706 -0.683 -0.487 1.078 0.910 
 (-1.25) (-0.93) (-0.42) (-0.23) (0.58) (0.45) 
ܮܶܣ௣,௧  (+) 1.734*** 1.764*** 1.003*** 1.047*** 1.410*** 1.410*** 
 (5.19) (5.31) (3.87) (4.97) (5.70) (6.03) 
ܧܶܮ௣,௧  (–) 0.225 0.454 1.383** 1.544** -0.405 -0.259 
 (0.23) (0.46) (2.32) (2.06) (-0.78) (-0.45) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௣,௧ሻ  (–) -0.140*** -0.149*** -0.064 -0.076* -0.114*** -0.117*** 
 (-3.65) (-4.01) (-1.45) (-1.79) (-2.69) (-2.94) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௣,௧  (+) 0.115 0.050* 0.100 0.041* 0.694*** 0.328*** 
  (1.48) (1.94) (1.54) (1.73) (2.83) (2.68) 
ܦ2ܦ௣,௧ (–)   -0.248*** -0.238***   
    (-5.90) (-4.85)   
ܸܱܮ௣,௧  (+)     4.024*** 3.792*** 
      (8.28) (15.43) 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௣,௧  (–)     0.029 0.033 
      (0.89) (0.88) 
ܴܧ ௣ܶ,௧  (–)     -0.545*** -0.625*** 
      (-3.88) (-4.51) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)   185.957**   182.074***   165.862*** 
    (2.40)   (3.31)   (4.29) 
Obs.  3,377 3,377 3,152 3,152 3,077 3,077 
R2  0.204 0.300 0.387 0.476 0.488 0.552 
Shapley R2 (%) for ܲݎሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത   33.7725  21.4178  16.6921 
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Table OA-8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Subsidiary CDS Spreads 
  Dependent variable: ܮܰ൫ܥܦܵ5 ௦ܻ,௧൯ 
Independent 
variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept -4.350*** -4.508*** -4.391*** -3.736*** -3.824*** -3.569*** -2.641** -1.665 -1.965 
(-5.73) (-6.72) (-7.68) (-4.91) (-5.09) (-5.83) (-2.15) (-1.05) (-1.27) 
ܴܱܰܣܫ௦,௧  (+) 0.776*** 0.848*** 0.810*** 0.766*** 0.834*** 0.838*** 0.612* 0.587* 0.546* 
 (2.84) (2.98) (3.08) (3.04) (3.22) (3.48) (1.83) (1.77) (1.92) 
ܴܱܣ௦,௧  (–) -0.709 0.998 1.129 1.525 3.385* 3.740** 1.236 2.933** 3.051*** 
 (-0.58) (0.47) (0.53) (1.20) (1.93) (2.06) (0.83) (2.19) (2.72) 
ܮܶܣ௦,௧  (+) 1.873*** 1.898*** 2.045*** 1.198*** 1.197*** 1.246*** 1.534*** 1.586*** 1.635*** 
 (5.16) (5.18) (6.98) (3.04) (3.16) (3.98) (7.66) (6.42) (6.73) 
ܧܶܮ௦,௧  (–) 0.378 0.324 0.002 1.693* 1.500 1.114 -0.157 -0.633 -0.873* 
 (0.69) (0.67) (0.00) (1.69) (1.39) (1.05) (-0.48) (-1.20) (-1.83) 
ܮܰሺܶܣ௦,௧ሻ  (–) -0.102** -0.125*** -0.161*** -0.063* -0.088** -0.133*** -0.258*** -0.324*** -0.326*** 
 (-2.48) (-3.03) (-4.10) (-1.83) (-2.56) (-4.02) (-2.97) (-3.31) (-3.54) 
ܤܣܰܭܴܣܶܧ௦,௧  (+) 0.079* 0.051*** 0.013*** 0.068* 0.044*** 0.009 0.539 0.167 0.031 
  (1.83) (3.13) (2.95) (1.76) (2.61) (1.26) (1.55) (1.29) (0.32) 
ܦ2ܦ௦,௧ (–)    -0.257*** -0.252*** -0.235***    
     (-4.46) (-3.17) (-2.84)    
ܸܱܮ௦,௧  (+)       5.111*** 4.757*** 4.490*** 
        (8.91) (5.44) (4.93) 
ܴܵܫܼܧ௦,௧  (–)       0.181*** 0.224*** 0.206*** 
        (3.03) (3.62) (3.37) 
ܴܧ ௦ܶ,௧  (–)       -0.448** -0.544*** -0.632*** 
        (-2.29) (-2.80) (-3.34) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ  (+)  252.338** -36.130  243.852*** -30.633  253.852*** 46.508 
   (2.03) (-0.36)  (2.70) (-0.52)  (2.74) (0.95) 
ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  (+)   298.672***   287.752***   237.526*** 
    (3.57)   (3.89)   (3.89) 
Obs.  1,198 1,198 1,167 1,069 1,069 1,044 509 509 497 
R2  0.147 0.248 0.322 0.297 0.389 0.454 0.458 0.546 0.594 
Shapley R2 (%) for ܲݎሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ   41.0401 16.6173  24.2991 11.0303  18.4935 9.4582 
Shapley R2 (%) for ܲݎሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത  35.7715   25.3073   19.0053 
Total R2contribution of group variables (%)  52.3888   36.3376   28.4635 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines the association between group-level variables and cross-sectional variation in parent and subsidiary credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads for the CDS Sample (see Table OA-2, Panel A) of parent and subsidiary firm-years. The number of observations decreases with respect to the specification 
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presented in Table 1, Panel A of the paper due to data availability requirements on 5-year CDS spreads (Columns (1) and (2)), distance to default (Columns (3) and (4)) and 
market variables (Columns (5) and (6)). Panel A reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics for the sample of parent firms 5-year CDS contracts, where the 
dependent variable is equal to the natural logarithm of the spread at the end of year ݐ. Panel B presents a similar analysis for a sample of subsidiary firms 5-year CDS contracts. 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the Shapley values assessing the marginal contribution of ܲݎ	ሺ ௦ܻ,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതത	 (ܲݎ	ሺ ௣ܻ,௧ାଵሻ		and ܲݎ	ሺ ௢ܻ௧௛௘௥௦,௧ାଵሻതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത) to the R2 of the respective model. In Panel A 
(Panel B) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the parent (subsidiary) and year level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in the paper Appendix. The subscripts ݌, and ݏ are used to identify parent- and subsidiary-level variables, respectively. 
